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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

Concepts of protest in Africa, like historical concepts elsewhere, have undergone considerable change through the last half century, and it is possible at present to distinguish three schools of thought. These are the colonialist school, the nationalist, and, for want of a more specific term, the revisionist.

The first in time, the colonialist, had its roots in the attitudes of explorers and military commanders, then developed through early civil administrators and settlers, and ultimately was reiterated by biographers, historians, and Royal Commissions. In Kenya, for instance, there is a common ideology that runs through the writings of Hall, Meinertzhagen, Eliot, Cranborne, Huxley, Leakey and the Corfield Report. This school regarded any form of protest as a rebellion against the Europeans' beneficent design to eradicate African primitivism and instill the common or civil law, orderly government, Christianity, capitalism, and other aspects of European "civilization." Protest thus was an evil with no redeeming quality. Its motivation stemmed from the selfish ambitions of chiefs and elders, the machinations of witchdoctors, the innate hostility or aggressiveness of certain "tribes," base communal rituals, and from the general emotionalism and irrationality of a backward people. Since protest, in popular definition, connotes the possibility of a legitimate basis for opposition, the colonialist school avoided the term. Uprising, rebellion, revolt, riot, insurrection, disturbance, and, in the extreme, war, were the descriptive words.

Beginning in the late fifties, as it became obvious that Africans were moving rapidly and irresistibly toward independence, new concepts

of African protest gained the ascendency. Their beginnings in East African history can be found in the writings of early humanitarians such as McGregor Ross, Norman Leys, and Leonard Woolf, all of whom found legitimacy and rationality in much of the Africans' opposition to the imposition and maintenance of European rule. To them the evil was inherent in imperialism and colonialism rather than in the African opposition. The new concepts that emerged in the fifties and flowered in the sixties added to these antecedents a glorification of the struggle for independence and the establishment of nationhood. The word "protest" was employed to describe African opposition in all its varieties from the inception of the European presence. The leaders of the new school for East Africa--Carl Rosberg, Robert Rotberg, and the Dar es Salaam historians led by Terrence Ranger--tended to associate all protest with nationalism. What Ranger called "primary and secondary resistance" and Rotberg "resistance and rebellion" were in essence what others recognized as "protonationalism and nationalism." Not surprisingly these historians collectively were soon regarded as the nationalist school. Joined by many young African historians, who in the chauvinistic climate of new nationhood naturally concentrated on the winning of independence, this school rolled out publications, dominated the learned journals, monopolized lecture platforms, and, in short, gained a popular favor no less than that enjoyed in preceding decades by the colonialist historians.

Within the last few years, many young scholars, acting for the most part independently of one another, have found new reasons to attack the colonialist concepts and have become sharply critical of the nationalist school. Since their ideas have not coalesced as yet into a central theme,

they may be described temporarily as merely the revisionist historians. They perhaps do not yet deserve the designation of a school. In revising colonialist interpretations, they have employed the techniques of the nationalists, i.e., a minute examination of written sources, many of which were not available in the colonial period, and a pervasive collection of oral evidence. In most instances, however, they have sought and interpreted this information without the preconceived, ideological theories and values attributed to the nationalists. While often adopting nationalist phraseology such as "primary and secondary resistance," these historians have developed the new terminology of sub-imperialism, collaboration, communicators, and modernizers. Basic to their approach is the rejection of the thesis of a continuity of opposition through the entire colonial period and the tie of all protest to nationalism. They deny that all or even a significant portion of African protest embodied the cultural cohesiveness, unity of purpose, and specific goals essential to nationalism. At the same time, however, some have undermined the importance of protest by suggesting that African collaboration, an opposing theme, is perhaps even more deserving of consideration. A few have turned from an emphasis on Africans to a study of non-European minority communities, such as the Asians and Arabs, to explore their contributions to the overall history, including protest. Like revisionists at any time, these historians in their entirety have not been popular. While editorial boards and history departments are dominated by adherents of the nationalist school, it has been difficult for them to publish and to hold responsible positions.

Because of the increasing attention given to African protest, largely through nationalist writings, the Program of Eastern African Studies at Syracuse University decided to devote its spring seminar in 1971

to the subject. At the suggestion of Alan Smith, the new Assistant Professor of African history, papers were solicited from younger scholars in the United States, Britain, and Africa who had just completed extensive field research and could be expected to introduce fresh concepts. The authors were invited to preside over discussions of their papers, and the sessions were held biweekly. As the semester progressed, it became apparent that the papers as a whole were not only innovative and challenging, but highly critical of the prevailing nationalist themes. It was a revisionist seminar.

The authors of the three papers presented in this volume were typical. They had received intensive training in African history at universities with established African study programs, had lived in Africa for relatively long periods of time, and had recently returned after independent research in the field to write dissertations and begin teaching careers. All were eager to publish their findings and conclusions of African protest.

Robert M. Maxon, Assistant Professor of History at West Virginia University, has an unusually broad base for scholarship relative to Kenya. After a B.A. at Duke University in 1961 and brief enrollments at Columbia University, the University of London, and Makerere in Kampala, he served four years as Education Officer for the Government of Kenya. In 1965 he began studies for a Ph.D. in African history at Syracuse University. While there he directed the teaching of Swahili to Peace Corps trainees and was a research assistant in the Program of Eastern African Studies. During 1968-69 Maxon completed in Kenya the field research for his dissertation, "British Rule in Gusiiland, 1907-63," and in 1972 he received the Ph.D. Maxon is a competent scholar. As a graduate student he was awarded Woodrow Wilson, Fulbright-Hays, and Shell International fellowships.

His publications include four articles on the Gusii, another article on John Ainsworth, and the book A Guide to the Kenya National Archives, of which he was co-author.

Painstaking in research, naturally skeptical of others' generalizations, and very independent in his approach, Maxon as an historian tends to defy classification. In the following article, "Early Gusii Resistance to British Rule, 1905-14," he shows neither the pro-settler and anti-resistance views characteristic of colonialist historians, nor the ideological assumptions associated with the nationalists. Much of his article is devoted to a correction of statements on Gusii protest by an earlier historian, Audrey Wipper, whose views on the whole coincide with those of the colonialist school, and whose research, in Maxon's view, was quite inadequate. Instead of Ranger's "primary resistance," Maxon uses the phrase "early resistance," and he makes no attempt to tie this incipient Gusii protest to nationalism. On the other hand, he does not specifically dissociate the resistance from a nationalist movement. Though not mentioning the word "collaboration," he asserts that the Gusii response to British rule was neither completely hostile, nor completely friendly. In these ways Maxon appears simply as a revisionist without the usual pronounced anti-nationalist bias. Though convincing throughout, Maxon's article deserves some criticism. He leaves the impression, especially in view of Strayer's and Steinhart's detailed analyses, that he should have devoted less attention to Wipper's mistakes and more to a description of Gusii motivation.

Robert W. Strayer, Assistant Professor of History at New York State University College, Brockport, should be considered a leading authority on mission history in East Africa. His interest in the subject is long-standing.

He was raised in a Pennsylvania family and environment in which missions played an important role. He received a B.A. at Wheaton College in 1964 and an M.A. at the University of Wisconsin in 1966. The next two years he and his wife spent in Ethiopia as Peace Corps volunteers, and during that time they traveled widely in East Africa. In 1968 Strayer returned to Wisconsin for predoctoral studies in African history. The following year he explored mission archives in Britain and then moved to Kenya for five months of field research on the history of the Church Missionary Society Since receiving a Ph.D. in 1971, Strayer has written two articles on missions in Africa and a book-length manuscript on protest in Kenya, all of which are forthcoming publications. He now has an award from the SUNY Research Foundation for the preparation of a second book on the history of an Anglican mission community in colonial Kenya.

Strayer's article, "Missions and African Protest: a Case Study from Kenya, 1875-1935," is more easily identifiable than Maxon's as a revisionist writing. Strayer may borrow the nationalist phrase "primary resistance" and agree with John Iliffe's thesis that "colonial rule cannot be seen as a process of European initiative and African response." But he devotes much detail to the subject of collaboration, which, in his view, is essential to an understanding of the subsequent protest. He expressly refutes the nationalist hypothesis that missions were attractive, especially in the initial stages, only to outcasts, exiles, and old women. He also clearly dissociates African protest, at least in the mission sphere, with nationalism and, to some degree, with anti-colonialism. Anti-mission protest, he found, was a result of cultural differences and a variety of political and economic aims very few of which could be associated with nationalist aspirations. Strayer's title is misleading since a case study, in the usual sense, is concerned with one people in a single locality.

The peoples under his purview range from the coastal Rabai to the highlands Kikuyu, and his article is really a survey over a large area. But it is obvious that Strayer has examined a wide range of sources and that his conclusions are derived from the evidence rather than any preconceived conceptions.

Edward I. Steinhart is currently Assistant Professor of History at the University of Texas at Austin. He did his graduate work at UCLA and at Northwestern, where he received his Ph.D. in 1971. He is a scholar of diverse interests. His published articles range from discussions of contemporary student movements in South Africa to considerations of the broad topic of feudalism in Africa. His main interest, however, remains the Lacustrine kingdoms of western Uganda. During 1968 and 1969 he worked in the national archives of Uganda, and conducted a series of interviews in Bunyoro, Toro, and Ankole. At the moment he is revising his doctoral dissertation, entitled "Transition In Western Uganda: 1891-1901," adding additional material, in anticipation of publication.

The title of Steinhart's article, "The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907: Anti-colonial Protest and the Nationalist Myth" is revealing of his professional view. He is obviously a revisionist. Unlike Maxon and Strayer, who were only indirectly critical of the nationalist school, Steinhart has purposely posed as a chief critic. His detailed foreword, in which he distinguishes between colonialist and nationalist interpretations and expounds the revisionist arguments, marks him as an iconoclast with a keen perception. In his description of the 1907 rebellion in Bunyoro, Steinhart mixes the terminology of the nationalist authors by using, in one instance, the phrase "primary resistance" and, in another, the words

"resistance and rebellion." But he also employs the revisionist terminology of "sub-imperialism," "communicators," and "modernizers" and, like Strayer, gives great attention to collaboration. Throughout he is critical of nationalist ideology. His description of the Nyangire uprising is quite detailed, but well balanced, and on the whole his arguments on African protest are revealing and convincing.

Like most challenging and thought provoking writings, Steinhart's article is open to criticism. In offering new concepts as substitutes for those in force, there is a tendency to over-generalize, to attribute positions and values to others which are only partly true, and Steinhart, with some justification, will be vigorously criticized by some adherents of the nationalist school. Moreover, he apparently was inspired before undertaking this study by D. Barnett, John Saul, and a few others who have described peasant unrest as a major cause of African protest, and in his concluding sentences Steinhart proposes a populist hypothesis as a basis for further study. If pursuing this methodology, he may be subject to the same criticism that he levels at the nationalists, i.e., seeking facts to justify a theory as distinct from formulating conclusions on the basis of the evidence. Though he attempts to thwart this criticism by calling for pursuance only of a "myth of populist insurrection," with the implication that it will produce valuable new insights and contribute ultimately to an objective view of African protest, he is advocating, in fact, what most historians would not accept, that in research the end can justify the means.

In presenting these three articles, there has been no attempt by the editor to impose on the authors a common punctuation, style of writing,

or footnote citation. Minor inconsistencies, so far as they could be ascertained, were eliminated, but with their exception, the articles have been published in the form in which they were submitted.

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MISSIONS AND AFRICAN PROTEST: A CASE STUDY FROM KENYA, 1875 - 1935

Robert W. Strayer

African protest against European mission activity has been generally studied only at the point of rupture with parent mission bodies leading to the formation of independent schools and churches. Yet a recent examination of independent churches has indicated that such breakaway groups represented only the tip of an iceberg of African disaffection with missions.[1] Furthermore, various types of opposition existed outside as well as within the mission community. Missions, therefore, have constituted an important focus of African protest during the colonial period and afford an opportunity to examine the kind of strains, tensions and conflicts engendered by a "clash of cultures" under colonial conditions.

The roots of such African opposition date virtually from the inception of mission activity and derive from a wide variety of sources. "Primary resistance" and later movements of political protest were directed on occasion against missions as well as against the colonial government. Some of those who initially collaborated with missionaries for their own economic or political ends later found this association more a liability than an asset and so came to oppose the missionary presence. Finally, many who saw in the mission a means of "improvement" became disillusioned and frustrated with their inability to chart their own course to progress within the mission community. While all of these sources of opposition to missions were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a European-dominated colonial society, the protests expressing this opposition were

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[1] David Barrett, Schism and Renewal in Africa (Nairobi, 1968), p. 179.

by no means always "nationalist" or even explicitly "anti-colonial" in character. Rather, groups and individuals responded to the missionary presence in terms of their own goals and interests and in terms of their various perceptions of the relationship between missions and colonial regimes.

To illustrate the nature of anti-mission protest, I have chosen to examine African responses to the presence of the Anglican Church Missionary Society (CMS) in central and eastern Kenya until the mid-1930's.[1] In the last quarter of the nineteenth century the primary focus of Anglican efforts was on the coast in the freed slave settlements of Freretown and Rabai as well as among the Arab, Swahili and Indian communities of Mombasa. After 1900 the focus of CMS work shifted steadily to the central highlands, an area inhabited by the Kikuyu and related peoples and increasingly subjected to the encroachment of European settlers. Outside of these areas, the CMS also established itself among the peoples of the immediate coastal hinterland, particularly the Giriama, Rabai, and Digo groups, and in the Taita hills about 100 miles northwest of Mombasa.

Since much anti-mission protest resulted from disillusionment at the failure or inability of mission agencies to fulfill the roles which Africans expected of them, it will be necessary at the outset to examine briefly the attractions which missions held for a wide variety of African individuals

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[1] While occasional references have been made to the female circumcision crisis of 1929, it will not be treated in detail, partly because it is the most well-known example of anti-mission protest in Kenya. Also, it is an extraordinarily complex set of events and could not adequately be examined within the confines of this paper.

and groups. The range of motives involved in the pattern of African response to the CMS makes it necessary to modify the frequently stated hypothesis that those whose interests were engaged by missions, particularly in the early days, were merely the "deracines of tribal society."[1] While mission stations were indeed viewed as refuges by "outcasts. . . exiles or old women," they were also regarded by others in rather different ways.

The political implications of the missionary presence were doubtless uppermost in the minds of African rulers as they made their initial contacts with the white strangers. Those who responded positively to mission overtures were generally mindful of the missionaries' contacts with those more powerful forces in the outside world and hoped to reap certain advantages for themselves or their communities by establishing friendly relations with the newcomers.

In the pre-colonial period it was often the influence which missionaries were believed to have with the Arab authorities in Mombasa or Zanzibar that provided an early point of contact with coastal peoples. The Rabai provide a case in point. The friendly reception accorded to J. Krapf and J. Rebmann, the two earliest CMS missionaries in East Africa, by the Rabai in the mid-19th century, owed much to their concern for their relationship with the rulers of Mombasa. In Coupland's words, they were "too close to Mombasa with its Baluchi garrison to ignore the fact that Krapf and his colleagues enjoyed the favor and protection of the

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[1] L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire (New York, 1967), p. 276.

Governor."[1] The Rabai came to view the CMS as a potential intermediary or broker between themselves and Arab power on the coast. Thus, in 1879 the elders of Kaya Fimboni in Rabai country begged the mission to send them a teacher and build them a church. Many were even willing to discard their charms to persuade the mission of their sincerity. It was soon discovered, however, that their real motive was to get rid of a group of Swahilis living in their village. It was their hope that CMS missionary H.K. Binns could persuade the Wali, or governor, of Mombasa to oust the intruders. Binns' response to this situation was typical of much missionary frustration:

> I reasoned with the old men and asked them how it was that they never came to me except they were in some trouble and wanted me to help them out of it, but as to coming to hear the Gospel preached, they never did and in times of plenty they hardly ever came near our village.[2]

If the initial political relevance of CMS missionaries to African societies lay in their connections with coastal Arab authorities, the advent of formal British rule after 1895 meant, of course, that missionaries were viewed as an integral part of this new political reality. It should be remembered that most African societies in Kenya lacked traditionally sanctioned "chiefs" so that the British were anxious to enlist the cooperation of anyone with a wider than local prominence, however that prominence had been achieved.[3] A number of such individuals, and some who had simply

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[1] Reginald Coupland, East Africa and Its Invaders (Oxford, 1938), p. 409. For a 17th century example of coastal peoples' concern about their political relationship with Mombasa, see Coupland, pp. 63-65.

[2] CMS/03, Binns to CMS, August 7, 1879.

[3] For a comparison of the type of people among whom the British found their main allies in Kikuyu and Kamba country respectively, see J.F.S. Munro, "The Machakos Kamba under British Rule, 1889-1939." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin 1968, p. 79. He suggests that broker-traders were the most prominent British allies among the Kamba, while military leaders played this role in Kikuyu society

ingratiated themselves with the British, seemed to believe that a positive response to missionaries would serve to solidify their standing with the colonial authorities. There were others, however, who apparently saw less need thus to prove their loyalty owing to a previously established relationship with the British or to a particularly strong local power base.

An excellent example of one who initially "collaborated" with both government and missions was Karuri wa Gakure, who in the decade or so prior to British conquest had established his prominence in the Murang'a or Fort Hall district of Kikuyuland through his reputation as an arbitrator, warrior and trader as well as through a short term military alliance with the European trader, John Boyes.[1] This latter connection had sufficiently impressed Karuri with the value of cooperation with the white man that in 1900 he readily entered into an agreement with the Protectorate officials, which enabled the British to bring Murang'a under their control largely without the use of punitive expeditions. Since the CMS and other missions were attempting to establish themselves in Kikuyuland at this time, it was not unreasonable for Karuri to pursue a friendly policy toward them as a means of consolidating his alliance with the British. Thus, in September 1901, he invited A. W. McGregor, the first CMS missionary in Kikuyuland, to visit his residence at Tutho and subsequently provided a number of students for McGregor's school. A number of

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[1] University College, Nairobi-Research Project Archives (UCN:RPA), B/2/2(2), "Biography of Karuri," by Charles M. Mucaha. Transcript of interviews also included.

other aspiring individuals did likewise and in 1908 McGregor baptized eight young men, all of whom had been sent to the mission by local "chiefs" or prominent men.[1]

There were those, however, who saw the coming of the missionaries as a potential threat to their already established positions. Karanja wa Mariti, who had been station headmaster at Fort Smith in southern Kikuyuland since 1895, firmly refused to allow the CMS to establish a station in the immediate vicinity of the fort when approached by McGregor in 1900.[2] While the reasons for his refusal are not altogether clear, it is certainly possible that already enjoying the confidence of the administration, he felt himself in a sufficiently strong position not to need this additional indication of his loyalty. Similarly, Gutu wa Kibetu, the powerful Paramount Chief of Embu, was decidedly reluctant to see the CMS establish itself in his area, fearing correctly that missionaries would act as spies for the colonial government. While he was unable to prevent the mission from obtaining land in Embu, he did manage to have them located a considerable distance from his own residence, unlike Karuri who had invited the CMS to settle at his own headquarters.[3]

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[1] KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithega Log Book; CMS/1908/58, Mombasa Diocesan Magazine, April, 1908.

[2] KNA: DC/MKS/1/5/1, Ukamba Province Quarterly and Special Report, December, 1909; Interview with Chief Josiah Njonjo, January 28, 1970.

[3] KNA: PC/CP. 1/1, Central Province Political Record Book; PC/CP.1/5/1, Office of PC, Nyeri to Chief Secretary, January 19, 1917; Daudi Petero, Jubilee A.C. Kigari and A.C. Kabare (1910-1960), n.d., p. 21.

If the presence of missionaries had political implications for African societies, CMS activity also touched their economic interests in a variety of ways. In the pre-colonial period, missionaries were viewed on occasion by Africans as a potential element in their network of trading relationships. Krapf, for example, was warmly welcomed by Kivoi, a leading Kamba trader, who was engaged in extensive commercial relations with the coast. Kivoi told Krapf of his desire to conduct this trade via the Tana River in order to bypass the peoples of the coastal hinterland with whom he was competing for direct access to the markets of Mombasa.[1] He doubtless hoped that Krapf's contacts with the Governor of Mombasa and with the coastal peoples would further these commercial interests. Similar considerations may have motivated the early receptiveness to mission overtures of certain Miji Kenda peoples, such as the Rabai mentioned earlier, as well as the Digo and Giriama. In 1875, for example, CMS missionaries on the coast observed that a group of Giriama villages north of Rabai were asking for mission teachers "though their predominant motive may be (as almost confessed by themselves) the desire that traders in cloth, knives, etc., may settle among them."[2]

In other ways as well the mission could serve the economic interests of African people. The freed slaves who constituted the bulk of the population at Freretown and Rabai saw the mission most fundamentally as a

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[1] Johann Ludwig Krapf, Travels, Researches and Missionary Labours (Boston, 1860), pp. 238-242; John Lamphear, "The Kamba and the Northern Mrima Coast," in Pre-Colonial African Trade by Richard Gray and David Birmingham (London, 1970), pp. 75-102.

[2] CMS, Proceedings, 1874-75, p. 39. For a similar case among the Digo, see CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, W. A. Crabtree, October 29, 1892.

source of economic security. In the interior, missionaries were frequently regarded as employers from whom wages were demanded in return for attendance at school or church. As will be shown later, both of these groups protested vigorously when missionaries were unwilling or unable to fulfill these roles.

A final economic attraction of missions for Africans can be summarized in the term "improvement," a theme which emphasizes African initiative for change and represents a creative accommodation to colonial rule. Education was clearly among the most prominent of the means of improvement since it was a gateway to employment in the new occupations created by the colonial state and its associated enterprises. Since education in Kenya was for most of the colonial period virtually a mission monopoly, a growing number of people came to view favorably at least a nominal associaiton with the mission.

A major indication of the desire for improvement through education lay in African insistence on ever more and better education. As early as 1904, one CMS missionary at Freretown could report that a "keen desire for an advanced education is manifested by many of the lads."[1] Shortly before the war, a number of CMS agents petitioned the mission to provide a more advanced education as well as a boarding school for their children.[2]

Perhaps the most dramatic manifestation of the spirit of "improvement" lay in the rapid proliferation of outschools or "bush schools," which grew up around each of the mission's central stations as well as on settlers' farms and in urban areas, particularly in the post-World War I

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[1] CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Edwin Luckock, January 4, 1904.

[2] CMS/1918/30, Martin to Manley, May 1, 1918.

period. For example, the number of outschools around Kabeta station in southern Kikuyuland rose from three in 1917 to eleven in 1926, while in Fort Hall District, there were seven CMS outschools in 1920 and twenty only five years later.[1] It is of the utmost importance to realize that this proliferation of outschools was accomplished almost exclusively at African initiative and represented one of the major achievements of the "age of improvement." Local communities carefully nurtured these institutions, constructing their buildings first in thatch, then with mud bricks, and finally erecting with enormous pride a stone building with a tin roof.

While many Africans had associated themselves with the CMS as a means of pursuing some positive economic or political goal, others saw in the mission a means of escape from war, famine, political upheaval, family problems and increasingly from the demands of a colonial state. Around the turn of the century, for example, famine drove up to 900 people daily to seek food at Freretown, while some 2,000 settled at least temporarily near the mission.[2] Likewise, a large number of runaway slaves -- 900 by 1888 -- escaped from their Arab or Giriama masters to seek refuge at Rabai where many of them became assimilated among the mission's adherents.[3] The CMS station at Taveta similarly became a haven for political and famine refugees from a wide variety of surrounding ethnic groups.[4]

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[1] KNA: KBU/11, 19, Kiamba District Annual Reports, 1917-18, 1926; FH/1, 5, Fort Hall District Annual Reports, 1920-21, 1925.

[2] CMS/1899/90, 91, Binns to Baylis, April 10, 20, 1899.

[3] CMS/1899/17, Binns to Hardinge, December 7, 1898.

[4] Tayeta Chronicle, Jan., 1900. A census taken in late 1899 revealed the following ethnic distribution among the settlement's 312 residents: Masai-89; Taveta-72; Chagga-58; Taita-29; Ugweno-24; Ukamba-21; Kahe-9; others-10.

With the establishment of British rule and the creation of a settler-oriented economy, the demand for labor from settlers, chiefs and the administration itself was the form in which many people experienced the imposition of the new regime most directly. Recognized association with mission schools often served to shield individuals from these demands as missionaries were frequently able to negotiate arrangements with local district officers whereby properly registered students were excused from most or all of these demands for labor. Given this situation, it is not surprising that a number of young men viewed the mission school as a means of escaping the irksome labor demands of their new rulers. Government officials frequently complained that they did so with some success.[1]

During the First World War a large number of young men sought association with mission schools in order to avoid conscription into the Carrier Corps. In CMS schools this was reflected in a dramatic jump in attendance figures. Total enrollment grew from 1332 in 1913 to 2267 in 1914, and again to 3304 in 1916.[2] Many observers echoed the Giriama District Officer who wrote: "It is certain that many able-bodied men have recently started to read merely to escape from Carrier Corps and other work."[3]

A final cluster of motives that attracted people to the mission

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[1] KNA: KBU/7, Dagorett Annual Report, 1915-16; NYI/10, Nyeri Political Records.

[2] CMS, Proceedings, 1913-14, p. 62; 1914-15, p. xxiii; 1916-17, p. 41.

[3] KNA: Coast Province 20/136, Giriama Handing Over Report, May 14, 1918.

can be lumped together as religious or personal in nature. Some individuals seem to have been attracted simply by curiosity at the novelty of the missionary enterprise.[1] For others, the techniques of literacy seemed to have a supernatural dimension. Consider Jomo Kenyatta's assertion that "Education, especially reading and writing, was regarded as the white man's magic and thus young men were very eager to acquire the new magical power."[2] Missionaries did not always discourage the view of education as magic. J. A. Wray, for example, gave public demonstrations of the white man's ability to make paper talk by writing the name of some object on a piece of paper, following which one of his students would hand him the object, all without a word. Wray observed that this technique was effective in stimulating a desire to read.[3]

In some areas, missionaries themselves were thought to possess such supernatural power as to give or withhold rain at will. When one missionary asked the Taita people near his station in 1907 why they did not send their children to school, he reported them as replying: "Yes, we will all come, if you will give us some rain."[4] Again, missionaries did not discourage the view that rain could be supernaturally influenced, for they firmly believed so themselves. There were many examples of

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[1] Taveta Chronicle, October 1899; CMS/1891/54, Steggall to Lang, January 13, 1891.

[2] Jomo Kenyatta, Facing Mount Kenya (New York, 1962), p. 262.

[3] J. A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 44

[4] CMA, Extracts of Annual Letters, R. A. Maynard, November 30, 1908.

missionaries' prayers for rain and of fluctuations in school and church attendance on the basis of their successes or failures.

Such, then, were the attractions of the CMS for the African societies of central and eastern Kenya. Many, however, perceived the mission as a threat rather than an opportunity virtually from the beginning of contact. Others came to such a view only after some experience with the Anglican missionaries. Still others sought to modify certain CMS policies and control mission institutions without altogether breaking with the mission. In turning directly to these various manifestations of African protest, it will be well to distinguish between those expressions of hostility to the CMS which arose outside the mission community and those forms of antagonism and conflict which were generated within it. Although these two sources of anti-mission sentiment shared certain common grievances, the articulation of these grievances remained largely separate until the late 1920's. The outbreak of the circumcision crisis in 1929 represented in certain respects a merging of these two strands of anti-mission protest, a conjuncture which accounts in part for the depth and intensity of that controversy.

One of the major external sources of opposition to the CMS derived from the elders of African societies and was basically cultural in nature. Those who identified with the mission, after all, found themselves part of a group which was sharply distinguished from the surrounding society. This differentiation was based largely on a rejection of certain aspects of their traditional cultures and on the hostility which this rejection engendered. Fundamentally responsible for this situation

were the missionaries themselves. Their view of African culture drove them to demand far-reaching changes in the beliefs and behavior of their adherents. "So immoral are many of the customs of tribal life," wrote one Presbyterian missionary, "that he [the African convert] is constrained to hold a different relationship to his tribe than non-Christians have. . . They are bound to form in one sense a new community. . ."[1] Missionaries and their early converts, moreover, frequently insisted on taking the religious offensive against their pagan neighbors, sometimes deliberately desecrating traditional sacred places. McGregor himself on occasion went about with a skull tied on a string, threatening to touch people who refused to attend church.[2]

Two related consequences flowed from such beliefs and actions. First, many of those who had associated themselves with the mission, for whatever reasons, became seriously alienated from their people. Johana Muturi, one of the first Christians in the Fort Hall area, observed that in the early days conversion meant that one was regarded as being "lost."[3] A CMS missionary noted the same feeling among the Giriama. "The cry among these people is that if their children become Christians, they are lost to them."[4] No one has better captured this sense of alienation than James Ngugi in The River Between:

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[1] Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA), Ed. 1912-19, CMS answers to Orr's Questions, April 29, 1912.

[2] UCN-RPA: D/3/2(2), H.S.K. Mwaniki, "The Impact of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23;" CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed, Dec. 18, 1905; Matthew Mwangi, "History of Weithaga."

[3] St. Paul's Divinity College, Research Project, Johana Muturu interviewed by Eliud Kariithi, August, 1965.

[4] CMS, Extracts of Annual Letters, Miss F. Deed, August, 1904.

> Joshua. . . was then a young man who ran from the hills and went to live with the white man in the newly established Mission. He feared the revenge of the hills; the anger of his friends, betrayed. In Siriana [Mission] he found a sanctuary and the white man's power and magic. He learned to read and write. The new faith worked in him till it came to possess him wholly. He renounced his tribe's magic, power and ritual. He turned to and felt the deep presence of the one God. Had he not given the white man power over all? . . . He realized the ignorance of his people. He felt the depth of all the darkness in which they lived.[1]

Associated with the alienation of many mission adherents was the hostility of their elders. Among the Kikuyu it was mission opposition to both male and female circumcision and the associated initiation rites that produced the most intense antagonism. The depth of feeling that threats to female circumcision in particular produced may be judged by the following comment:

> You white men came among us and we seeing that you were good men welcomed you with both hands; we readily do all that you wish us to do. . . But in this matter of our girls we cannot see eye to eye to you and we cannot agree to obey you even if you attempt to coerce us.[2]

Though missionaries frequently performed circumcision on boys, such an operation was referred to as a Swahili custom and the practice in no way satisfied the initiation requirements of the Kikuyu. So great was the exasperation of parents that on occasion they used force to remove their children from the mission. Around 1913, for example, a number of boys slightly under the age for circumcision were captured from a CMS station in Embu and circumcised prematurely to make certain that they would be

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[1]James Ngugi, The River Between, p. 33.

[2]PCEA: Nyeri District Council and Education Committee, Minutes of Nyeri Native District Council, June 4, 1921.

properly initiated. Their age group was then called Kimate or the captured ones.[1] Such actions may be regarded as "protests of conservation," stimulated by a "sense of impending peril" to deeply held cultural values.[2] The focus of these protests was naturally limited to the area in which the threatened values were practiced and thus may have strengthened particularist as opposed to national loyalties.

It would be a mistake to conclude from this that African elders were totally opposed to change or completely rejected formal education. Rather, their hostility grew out of a determination to resist the wholesale cultural tranformation which the missionaries demanded of their children. Consider, for example, the statement made by a group of Taveta men to the CMS in 1904:

> We wish to be taught, but we do not wish to be compelled to give up the things we are accustomed to, such as drinking beer, having several wives and so on, but to be taught little by little so that afterwards we may come to understand ourselves about these things.[3]

A similar selectivity informed the attitude of a number of Kikuyu elders who discussed the status of mission adherents with administrative officials in 1912. They stated that they would encourage their children to go to the mission for education, although they indicated a preference for a government secular school. But they absolutely balked when matters touching

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[1] UCN-RPA: D/3/2(2). H.S.K. Mwaniki, "The Impact of British Rule in Embu, 1906-23."

[2] For this concept, see Ali A. Mazrui, "Toward a Theory of Protest," in Protest and Power in Black Africa, ed. Robert I. Rotberg and Ali A. Mazrui (New York, 1970), p. 1185.

[3] CMS, Proceedings, 1904, p. 89.

the integrity of the family were at stake. In particular, they refused to consider giving up the children of a Christian widow to her new husband upon remarriage, an action which would mean the loss of such children to the family of the dead husband.[1] Thus, when the young men during the 1920's and later insisted on separating modern education from the cultural demands of the missionaries, they were in a sense following in the footsteps of their fathers.

Anti-mission protest was not only cultural but also political in nature, for missionaries were frequently seen as an integral part of the European threat to the sovereignty of African communities. Thus, the Mazuri rebellion of 1895-96 involved attacks on the CMS center at Freretown as well as on government posts.[2] The mission, after all, had been a thorn in the side of slave-owning coastal Arabs for some two decades through its willingness to harbor runaway slaves.[3] Relations between the missionaries and the Arabs had often hovered on the brink of violence so that it was not unreasonable for the Arab rebels to regard mission stations as legitimate objects of attack.

A similar situation prevailed during the Giriama rising of 1914 when attacks on CMS stations as well as on mission adherents were an integral part of this rebellion against British rule. Furthermore, preparations for the rising had included an oath to kill anyone wearing foreign clothes.[4] Such expressions of protest were rooted in a basic

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[1] KNA: Coast Province 64/252A, Northcote to PC, Fort Hall, n.d.

[2] G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), p. 24.

[3] For a consideration of mission-Arab relations during this period, see Norman R. Bennet "The Church Missionary Society at Mombasa, 1874-1894," Boston University Papers on African History, (Boston, 1964).

[4] KNA: Coast Province 5/336, District Commissioner to Acting Provincial Commissioner, Mombasa, Sept. 13, 1914; C. Dundas: "Report on the Giriama Rising;" Coast Province 20/136, Handing Over Report, Nyika District, Nov. 13, 1915; G.S. Ngombo, "A Report on Oral Research on the Giriama Rising of 1914," an unpublished paper.

fact of life which missionaries were not always quick to perceive: that in colonial situations cultural issues could very readily become political ones.

A rather different form of political opposition to missions was expressed by government appointed chiefs. Far from wishing the destruction of the colonial system, such individuals frequently regarded missionaries as a threat to their position within that system. While many chiefs had welcomed missionaries during the period of political adjustments following the establishment of British rule in their respective areas, serious antagonisms soon developed in a number of places. This hostility was reflected in the chiefs' attempts to limit or retard the flow of their people to the mission. Karuri went so far as to prohibit use of the CMS outschools, while Gutu tried on one occasion to levy fines on those reading at the mission.[1]

Such developments were not altogether surprising, for the mission, considered as a separate community of missionaries and African adherents, had definite political implications. The presence of a European at the head of such a community meant that its members had an alternative means of contact with the colonial administration, particularly on matters involving quarrels with chiefs. H. D. Hooper, veteran of ten years experience in Kikuyuland (1916-26), commented on this problem:

> To the mission adherents. . . the missionary presented a heaven-sent opportunity of taking his case over the heads of chiefs and elders, since it was logical in his eyes to assume

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[1] CMS/1907/44, Conference Review of 1906; KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithoga Logbook, November, December 1906, May 1907; KNA: CMS/1/639, Kabare Logbook, July 12, 1915.

> that being of the same race, the missionary's advocacy would weigh more heavily with the District Officer than would the chief's allegations . . . The Chiefs, however, came to recognize the insidious threat to their authority from such means of bypassing their local jurisdiction.[1]

Missionaries, moreover, often reported the chiefs' misdeeds to the administration. And in the early days when chiefly power was unchecked by officially recognized councils of elders or by frequent touring of European officials, abuses were common. Finally, mission students were being increasingly used by the government as hut and poll counters, clerks, interpreters and medical agents. These people were much less under the influence of chiefs than his njama or retainers, who had previously performed such lower level administrative functions. McGregor reported in 1912 that his pupils had filled many of these positions in the Fort Hall district and noted Karuri's displeasure at the sight of these young men running all over his district with orders from the government.[2]

If chiefs can be regarded as disillusioned political collaborators with missionaries, there were also disillusioned economic collaborators, for the failure or inability of a missionary to perform an expected economic function could provoke African hostility. J. A. Wray, founder of the initially unsuccessful Taita mission in 1883, quoted the people of

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[1]CMS, Accession 85, H. D. Hooper typescript, pp. 15-16.

[2]CMS/1913/16, Annual Letter: A. W. McGregor, December 12, 1912.

Sagalla as telling him: "White man, you are living in our country, but you don't buy our ivory, cattle or slaves; neither do you pay our children for coming to school. We feel we are not getting the profit out of you we had hoped for."[1] At Kigari in Embuland about 50 students went on strike in 1911, a few days after the opening of the school, when they discovered that they were not to be paid for thus obliging the Europeans.[2] While missionaries regarded such demands as ludicrous, it was hardly unreasonable for Africans to view missionaries as employers, since many of them had been enticed to the mission station with gifts of beads, cloth, salt, or even money. Moreover, students were ecnomic assets to their families who considered it only just to be compensated for the loss of their children's labor.

In time, these external sources of opposition to missions diminished in importance. As the position of government chiefs was increasingly challenged by the rise of a younger, educated and politically conscious element, many chiefs began to view missionaries as "useful allies in combating a breakdown in their own authority."[3] Furthermore, popular hostility to missions was tempered as the economic and social rewards of mission education were perceived. At the same time, internal conflicts within the mission community were growing more intense. The most dramatic expression of this antagonism was the female circumcision controversy of 1929 in which mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice of clitoridectomy sparked the formation of many independent schools and churches.

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[1] J. A. Wray, Kenya, Our Newest Colony (London, n.d.), p. 26.

[2] E. May Crawford, By the Equator's Snowy Peaks (London, 1913), p. 128.

[3] CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript.

It is important to realize, however, that this crisis only revealed and perhaps intensified, but did not create, European-African conflict within the mission community. The history of the CMS suggests, in fact, that such internal conflicts were present from the very beginning of the mission's work in Kenya.

The source of these internal conflicts must be sought most fundamentally in the structure of the CMS community in which an unequal distribution of power produced an objective incompatibility of interests. It is necessary to stress this point in order to avoid the impression that such tensions were merely the result of cross-cultural misunderstanding.[1] While the "clash of cultures" is certainly an important element in any explanation of the nature of conflict in the CMS community, it can be best understood in the political context of the mission community as well as in that of the larger colonial society.

Throughout the period under consideration here, African pastors, teachers, converts and students protested their subordination and powerlessness within the mission community. Such dissatisfaction was evident in the earliest of the CMS communities, the freed slave settlements at Freretown and Rabai. Intimately associated with the founding of these communities was a group of men known as "Bombay Africans." These were ex-slaves who had been liberated earlier in the century and had been settled and educated by the CMS near Bombay. When Freretown and

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[1] For a view much along these lines, see T. Price, "The Missionary Struggle with Complexity," Christianity in Tropical Africa, ed. C.G. Baeta (London, 1968), pp. 106-08.

Rabai were established as freed slave settlements in 1875, the CMS imported some 150 of these "Bombay Africans" to assist in the work. Acting as catechists, interpreters, preachers, teachers and artisans, they were in large measure responsible for the successful establishment of the settlements. Yet their own position was ambiguous. On the one hand, missionaries regarded them primarily as model citizens of the settlements, living affirmations of the beneficent results of mission work and the designated model for the newly freed slaves. On the other hand, they considered themselves as co-laborers with the European missionaries and felt that they had a claim on European recognition and gratitude. Based on a premise of equality with the missionaries, such expectations issued in a kind of racial condescension and stereotyping that was becoming increasingly characteristic of European thought about Africans in general and educated Africans in particular.

By 1881, an incipient rebellion of at least the better educated Bombay Africans was in full swing. In a long memorandum they appealed over the heads of local missionaries to the Parent Committee in London.[1] After pointing out in detail the work undertaken by themselves, they summarized:

> In short, the work which has already been done here and what is being done now by the Europeans are done thro [sic] the Bombay Africans. For all this why should the missionaries be ever murmuring against the Bombay Africans?

The writers of the memorandum proposed that they be either stationed in a different location under a God-fearing missionary or that they be completely removed from the mission. Finally, they stated their refusal to receive communion from the missionaries until their letter was answered.

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[1] CMS/1881/30, Memorandum of Bombay Africans to CMS, February 28, 1881.

This memorandum illustrated the nature of their central demand; if not equality, at least recognition as the valued associates of the missionaries. While they wanted to work within the mission system, they had felt themselves driven almost to the point of rupture. The protest of the Bombay Africans brought a quick response from the mission. A senior official was dispatched to investigate the situation and certain changes in personnel and policy were made. Yet the problem of the relationship between the missionaries and their African employees persisted largely because the structure of the mission community and the attitudes of European missionaries were not fundamentally altered.

The Bombay Africans were not alone in expressing their feelings of deprivation. The newly freed slaves, who made up the great majority of the settlements' population, protested their lack of economic security in a variety of ways. As early as 1876, some 160 out of 180 members of a class for baptismal candidates boycotted the class in protest against some of their number having had part of their pay withheld by the CMS due to absence from work.[1] In the mid-1880s when famine and poor soil combined to render their means of livelihood extremely vulnerable, they organized to demand that the mission itself provide them with work.[2] And after the arrival of the British East Africa Company in 1888, a large number of freed slaves deserted the settlements, finding employment with the Company a more secure alternative to the precarious existence they led in the mission.[3]

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[1] CMS/M4/1876/104, Lamb to Wright, October 9, 1876.

[2] CMS/1884/115, Shaw to Lang, November 22, 1884.

[3] W.S. Price, My Third Campaign in East Africa (London, 1890), pp. 152, 169, 183 CMS/1889/283, Smith to Lang, September 25, 1889.

Neither the Bombay Africans nor the freed slaves had any mission-sanctioned channels through which to express their grievances, for prior to 1900 there were no institutional structures whatever through which they could contribute to the formation of mission policy. Discontent with this situation led to the creation during the 1890's of an African Workers Council, a body designed to unite all the educated African employees of the mission and to express their views on matters concerning the development of the church. The mission was suspicious of such an independent body, fearing that it "threatens to menace the authority of the mission."[1] It was in part the aggressive activities of this Council that after 1900 led the mission to create certain institutions of church government such as Bishop's Local Councils to deal with matters of discipline in individual congregations -- and, more importantly, an African Church Council (ACC), theoretically the beginning of an African church organization independent of the mission.

Though these institutions gave the appearance of African participation in the ecclesiastical affairs of the mission community, the reality was far from a genuine sharing of power and was perceived as such by many Africans involved in these bodies. Only six months after the establishment of the Bishop's Local Council at Rabai, for example, its members threatened to resign as a group unless they were granted greater powers.[2] A similar situation was apparent in the African Church Council.

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[1] CMS/1901/118, Burt to Baylis, June 13, 1901; 1901/153, African Workers Council, n.d.

[2] KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Logbook, February 6, August 14, 1900.

"The system works best," instructed the CMS Parent Committee in 1910, "when the Church Council is always led to realize that it is a subordinate body" reporting to the mission until the establishment of diocesan authority.[1] Such policies were in large measure responsible for a persistent shortage of both clergy and lay agents in the mission. By the outbreak of World War I, some forty years after the founding of Freretown, only three ordained Africans were at work in the mission and it was openly admitted that young men were decidedly reluctant to come forward for ordination.

While the pace of ordinations picked up after 1920, particularly in Kikuyuland, the problem of power remained unsolved. Perhaps the best illustration of the conflicts engendered in this way involves Bishop Heywood's attempt to create an Anglican ecclesiastical province in East Africa which would have established the Church's autonomy of Canterbury. African opposition to this proposal, which played an important and successful role in preventing its realization, was based on two related fears: first, that self-government in the church would mean permanent white domination in the church since "we have no Bishops and Archdeacons of our own colour in East Africa."[2] Second, they feared that ecclesiastical self-government would encourage political self-government which would likewise be controlled by whites. These fears were articulated in an appeal to the Parent Committee in 1937:

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[1] CMS/L10, Baylis to Rogers, October 6, 1910.

[2] P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript, pp. 26-27.

> In the Kenya Legislative Council we Africans are represented by Europeans, but, although they are very desirous to help, unfortunately they do not understand us well. It then becomes evident that if the Ecclesiastical Province takes place so early, we Africans will have to be represented in important meetings of the Church by Europeans who do not understand us.[1]

Africans, therefore, preferred to delay formal ecclesiastical independence until they were in a position to control the church, and in a variety of ways they sought to increase the degree of African power in mission and church affairs. Thus, in 1934 the African Church Council asked for permission to nominate all candidates for Divinity School training and requested that certain of the larger mission schools be placed under African Boards of Managers.[2] They also insisted on greater authority in financial matters.[3] Local congregations as well as the ACC sought to maintain control over their own affairs. Thus, when the CMS arbitrarily removed two well-liked African agents who were serving the Mombasa congregation, a "very antagonistic" attitude was provoked among the church members and the formation of an independent church was averted only by CMS concessions on the issue.[4]

The fundamental cause of African protest within the mission community was the sense of deprivation among Africans arising from European domination of that community. Consider the reaction of the African Church

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[1] Ibid.

[2] KNA: CMS/1/103, Minutes of Central Council of the ACC, July 30-Aug. 2, 1934.

[3] P. Mbatea to CMS, September, 1937, in CMS, Accession 85, Hooper typescript, p. 27.

[4] KNA: CMS/1/599, Hillard to Bishop, Sept. 25, 1933; Hillard to Bishop, Oct. 2, 1933; Hillard to Pitt-Pitts, Oct. 13, 1933; Pitt-Pitts to Hillard, Oct. 16, 1933.

Council when they discovered that no Africans were included on a mission committee charged with changing Kikuyu orthography:

> . . . may we request that in future when matters concerned with African peoples come before you, you consent of your great goodness first of all to consult with the people concerned in this matter.[1]

Very few missionaries perceived the problem of their relations with Africans in this light. One of those who did was W. E. Owen, CMS missionary in western Kenya, who succinctly summarized the roots of conflict in the mission community:

> Essentially the African in Kenya desires, passionately, to be free to manage his own church affairs without what he thinks is undue interference. He is dragooned in civil life by alien laws which he is not allowed a voice in forming. He wants to keep that dominance out of the church.[2]

While power disparity remained at the heart of internal mission-African conflict, particular issues changed over time. One persistent area of tension lay in what Africans regarded as mission attempts to limit their aspirations for social and economic improvement. African rejection of these limitations led to a prolonged crisis in the mission at Freretown between 1897 and 1902, characterized by mass resignations of mission employees and a strike in the Divinity School. Behind these expressions of protest lay a whole series of grievances by frustrated African "improvers." In the first place, missionaries were unwilling to permit Africans personal freedom in matters of dress, a reluctance which served to maintain the existing distribution of status within

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[1] KNA: CMS/1/103, Samuel Nguru to Secretary, Kenya Missionary Council, n.d.

[2] KNA: CMS/1/104, Owen to Smith, February 4, 1938.

the settlement. Teachers were therefore forbidden from wearing trousers and were required instead to wear the kanzu, a garment which they detested for its association with Arab or Swahili slave traders.[1] Mission employees were likewise discouraged from building their own houses or cultivating land to supplement their meager mission salaries.[2] Mission wages were consistently very low relative to prevailing rates in secular employment, a fact which played an important role in the resignations of 1897-99.[3] A final grievance lay in mission unwillingness to offer instruction in English, believing that it contributed to the "detribalization" of Africans. As late as 1919, one missionary could write that "the teaching of English broadcast would, more than anything else I know of, harm the spiritual life of the African church."[4] Since Africans viewed English as "necessary, nay essential, to one's future welfare in this Protectorate," they regarded mission reluctance in this area as having "precluded any idea of our children's advancement."[5] The strike in the CMS Divinity School in 1900 was sparked by the refusal of the principal to teach English or even to address his students in that language.[6]

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[1] CMS/1891/89, Binns to Lang, Feb. 28, 1891; 1900/119, Peel to Baylis, Aug. 20, 1900; KNA: CMS/1/634, Rabai Log Book, Feb. 7, 1895; Alfred R. Tucker, Eighteen Years in Uganda and East Africa. (London, 1908), I, p. 357.

[2] CMS/1895/102, Tucker to Baylis, March 4, 1895.

[3] CMS/1898/184, Minutes of Finance Committee, Nov. 1, 1898; 1899/112, Jones to Baylis, May 9, 1899; 1898/96, Semler to Binns, May 2, 14, 1898; 1898/96, Deimler to Finance Committee, April 9, 1898.

[4] CMS/1919/92, Burns to Britton, Nov. 26, 1919. Other reasons for his opposition to English teaching included "the danger in which such a course would place white women and girls" as well as "the danger of organizing against the government and Europeans."

[5] Jones to Education Commission in British East Africa Protectorate, Evidence of the Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919).

[6] CMS/1902/39, Peel to Baylis, January 25, 1902.

During the post-World War I period, it was primarily the inadequacy of mission education both in terms of quantity and quality that provoked the protest of African improvers. This idea was clearly expressed by the African Christian Educational Society, an organization which represented African adherents of the CMS and Methodist mission on the coast, in a statement to the Education Commission of 1919. The Society argued that existing schools were:

> quite inadequate to train pupils up to anything approaching a decent standard to start life either in government or commercial firms and that the present standard is required to be raised and fully trained teaching staff provided to cope with any improvements that may be instituted.

They concluded by advocating a system of industrial education, as well as a "miniature sort of University for the coast."[1]

Mission schools were regarded not only as educationally inadequate but politically suspect as well. Harry Thuku, earliest of the modern nationalists, was reluctant to trust even the best intentioned whites with the education of his people. He therefore appealed to Tuskeegee Institute for "our own man, a skinsman brother" to establish a "Tuskeegee in the African wilds."[2] Some years later a perceptive CMS missionary, Handley Hooper, explained the growing African dissatisfaction with mission schools by observing that

> . . . it is the desire to control their own destinies which makes them anxious to have an educational system which they imagine will be directed largely according to their own predilections.[3]

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[1] Noah Manasseh to Education Commission, in British East Africa Protectorate, Evidence of Education Commission (Nairobi, 1919).

[2] Thuku to Secretary, Tuskeegee Institute, Sept. 8, 1921, in K. J. King, "The American Background to the Phelps-Stokes Commissions. . .," Ph.D. Dissertation Edinburgh University, 1968, Appendix V.

[3] Edinburgh House Archives, Box 242, Hooper to Oldham, April 11, 1929.

If "protests of improvement" demonstrate African desire for free access to a wider range of modern educational and economic opportunities than missionaries were willing to grant, protests of preservation or restoration represent an African defense of their traditional cultures in the face of mission attacks.

Africans within the mission community as well as those outside it came to resent mission insistence on their discarding certain basic features of their customary ways of life. The persistently high turnover rate among mission employees, many of whom were dismissed for consulting diviners or taking a second wife, represented a continuing affirmation of the strength of indigenous culture. Moreover, during the 1920's, the theme of cultural integrity became an important element in Kikuyu nationalist ideology -- a body of ideas formulated and articulated largely by mission adherents. The pages of the Kikuyu journal Muigwithania were full of exhortations to adhere to or recover a variety of Kikuyu customs. Consider the following example. "Unless you hold onto the Kikuyu characteristics at this time, you will become like a little appendage on a goat, which is neither part of the meat nor of the skin."[1] Mission attacks on the vitally important custom of female circumcision in 1929 thus met with determined resistance both within and outside the mission and resulted in many places in a permanent rupture of the mission community.

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[1] Muigwithania, May, 1929.

A final expression of internal opposition to the CMS was political in nature, involving the identification of the CMS with the colonial state. In certain respects, this identification had served to attract Africans to the mission, and missionaries had come to regard themselves as spokesmen for African interests before the colonial government. They were officially recognized as such in 1924. But when, during the 1920's, the focus of African opposition to British rule came to center on educated mission adherents, missionaries found themselves unable to speak for their own followers, let alone for African interests generally. Harry Thuku was both critical and suspicious of missionaries and is said to have suggested that they were in the pay of settlers.[1] By the end of the decade, the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), the lineal descendant of Thuku's abortive movement, forthrightly declared: "No European can really and truly represent us. The only person capable of representing us really well is a man with a black skin."[2] And in the early 1930's this distrust of missionary spokesmen, particularly regarding the land question, had penetrated even to the staunch mission adherents in moderate parties such as the Kikuyu Loyal Patriots and the Progressive Kikuyu Party. Together with the KCA, they made clear their opposition to being represented by missionaries:

> . . . we do not want a self-Government to be born in Kenya because we have no representatives to speak

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[1]Edinburgh House Archives, Box 263, Hooper to Oldham, March 4, 1922.

[2]Muigwithania, February-March, 1929.

> for us in the Legislative Council [in] whom we can fully confide. Those who are considered our pleaders do not help us or speak for us as they ought.[1]

Such repudiation of missionary spokesmen (and at the same time of government appointed chiefs) reflected the rise of a new group of alternative "communicators,"[2] the mission-educated elite, who felt that they could speak for their people with greater authority and sympathy than either missionaries or chiefs. There were, in fact, solid reasons for their regarding missionaries as "pleaders. . .[who] do not help us." In the first place, missionaries had been closely associated with the government's bitterly resented policy of land alienation. Harry Leakey, CMS missionary at Kabete, complained that the government had twice used him to assure the people around his station that no more of their land would be taken, only to prove him a liar on both occasions.[3] Furthermore, missionaries had been actively involved in the attempt to suppress African political activity. McGregor, for example, had helped to collect sworn affidavits to justify the government in ordering Thuku's arrest.[4]

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[1] Presbyterian Church of East Africa, file marked "Political" 1933-, Koinange Mbiu and J. Kamau to Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, Octover 13, 1934.

[2] J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of African History, IX (1968), pp. 119-146. Lonsdale sees the chiefs as the old communicators of social needs and political ideas whose role was increasingly usurped by missionary-educated elites. I am arguing that missionaries had performed similar functions and were being similarly challenged.

[3] CMS/1911/110, Leakey to Baylis, October 6, 1911.

[4] KNA: CMS/1/625, Weithaga Logbook, April, 1922.

John Comely in Embu found himself "led by prayer" to rule that no member of the KCA could serve as a church elder.[1] Others attempted to assert mission influence, if not control, over emerging political movements by encouraging the formation of rival mission-sponsored associations.[2] Such actions, and the paternalist assumptions on which they were based, were largely responsible for this dimension of the internal opposition to missions.

This consideration of anti-mission protests points to several conclusions. First, while the roots of African protest were many and varied, almost all were conditioned by virtue of occurring within a colonial situation and were therefore to some extent politicized. Certain expressions of anti-mission sentiment were directly related to the political subordination of African communities. The Mazrui rebellion and the Giriama rising aimed at sweeping away the colonial regime and missions along with it. The Thuku movement and the Kikuyu Central Association hoped to ameliorate certain aspects of colonial rule through militant political organization and protest, but found missions frequently opposed to their tactics and sometimes hand in glove with the government. The anti-missionary attitudes of some chiefs were no less political in origin though they derived from a fear that the existence of mission communities headed by Europeans undermined their own authority.

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[1] KNA: CMS/1/637, Embu Logbook, September 1, 1928; July 5, 1929.

[2] Edinburgh House Archives, Box 236, H. D. Hooper: "Development of Political Self-Consciousness in the Kikuyu Native;" KNA: CMS/1/639, Kabare Logbook, April 4, 9, 1929.

Other expressions of protest were less directly political in nature. Protests of improvement and those of cultural preservation were not on the surface of political import. Yet in a colonial situation such concerns frequently assumed political overtones. In the late 1920's, Jomo Kenyatta, then editor of Muigwithania, observed that knowledge was the key to "rulership" in the modern world.[1] Many others echoed his belief and feared that mission education was designed to perpetuate African political as well as economic subordination. Cultural issues likewise took on political significance as illustrated in the female circumcision controversy of 1929. The emotion generated by this issue was effectively channeled into popular political protest by the Kikuyu Central Association. In a colonial situation, then, such issues:

> take on the function of signs that are being consciously utilized to express resistance to a foreign order and to foreign values as well as to pledge fidelity to their own system of values.[2]

A final way in which anti-mission protests were political in character lay in African rejection of their subordinate role within the mission itself. However, this internal political struggle within the CMS community paralleled and interpenetrated political events in the larger society. In the first place, the establishment of British rule certainly strengthened the position of missionaries relative to Africans within the CMS community. For example, the Bombay African pastor, William Jones,

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[1] Muigwithania, December, 1928-January, 1929; April, 1929.

[2] Pierre Bourdieu, The Algerians (Boston, 1962), p. 156.

who had been in charge of the secular as well as religious affairs of Rabai, was abruptly relieved of much of his authority upon the creation of the British East Africa Protectorate in 1895 only to be replaced by a European missionary, A. G. Smith. It was Jones' very understandable resentment of such treatment that sparked the 1897 crisis on the coast. The connection which Africans later made between mission-sponsored ecclesiastical independence and settler-sponsored political self-government, both of which were rejected on the grounds that they would lead to permanent white domination, further illustrates the links between internal mission struggles and the politics of a colonial society.

A second major conclusion concerns not the roots or expression of anti-mission protest, but rather its consequences. If the colonial situation influenced the nature of such protests, did this African opposition have any impact on mission policy or on the development of mission institutions? While the ability of Africans generally to significantly influence events in colonial societies was relatively circumscribed, there were a number of areas in which they "retained some control over their own destinies."[1] The mission community was one of these, and in a variety of ways African protests helped to shape the development of the CMS community.

In the first place, the timing of mission expansion and the location of mission stations was not a matter which Europeans decided on their own. The hostility of the coastal Arab community largely prevented the

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[1] J.F.A. Ajayi, "Colonialism: An Episode in Africah History," Colonialism in Africa, 1870-1960, ed. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan (London, 1969), I, 508.

CMS from establishing itself among the Giriama until the coming of the Imperial British East Africa Company neutralized this source of opposition. On the other hand, the encouragement of men such as Karuri facilitated the founding of mission centers in central Kikuyu-land and elsewhere.

Beyond this, mission policies on a variety of issues were influenced by African protests. A significant rise in wages for mission employees grew directly out of the 1897-1899 crisis at Freretown. Persistent African demands for more instruction in English were a constant constraint on mission curricular planning.[1] Finally, the CMS policy on the circumcision question became progressively more moderate during the course of the controversy, for missionaries correctly feared that to do otherwise would result in the permanent rupture of the mission community.

African pressures also influenced the development of certain mission institutions. The establishment of a mission controlled African Church Council was clearly related to the prior formation of an active, aggressive and independent African Workers Council. Conversely, African opposition to the creation of an ecclesiastical province was a major element in the failure of this scheme.

Lastly, African protest against missions conditioned the development of the CMS community by altering in certain respects the larger environment within which the missionary enterprise was pursued. Thus, African dissatisfaction with mission education and corresponding African

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[1] See, for example, KNA: CMS/1/288, Beecher to Smith, August 4, 1936.

insistence on government schools were important factors in persuading the government to play a more active role in educational matters. By 1929, it was admitted that African demands were becoming the "dominating factor in the situation."[1] The need for the administration to respond positively to these demands substantially undercut the ability of missions to take initiatives in educational affairs and was responsible for the defensive character of their relationship with the government throughout the 1920's and later. Furthermore, intense African opposition to mission attempts to abolish the Kikuyu practice of clitoridectomy made the government exceedingly reluctant to support the missions on this issue.[2] This politically inspired reluctance was a necessary condition for a relatively successful African defiance of missions and for the establishment of independent schools and churches.

In many respects, Professor Iliffe's recent analysis of the role of African initiative in colonial societies is particularly relevant to mission communities.

> African response can no longer be described in the negative terms of resistance. Attempts to initiate, accelerate and control change become at least equally important. Second, and following from this, colonial rule cannot be seen as a process of European initiative and African response. Instead, a very complex pattern emerges, a pattern of local initiatives and local bargains, an interplay between European and African aims. . .[3]

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[1] Education Department, Annual Report, 1929, p. 8.

[2] "Legislation to prevent this practice would be most difficult to enforce and premature action might have the effect of uniting native authorities against the government in defense of old customs." KNA: DC/EBU/8/2, Watkins to All Senior Commissioners, September 21, 1925.

[3] John Iliffe, Tanganyika Under German Rule, 1905-1912, (Nairobi, 1969), p. 6-7

Thus, European missionaries were perhaps as often responding to African pressures as they were implementing their own preconceived ideas and plans. Conversely, the African response to missions, both that of "collaboration" and of protest, was neither passive nor simply reactive, but consisted in a rational pursuit of particular goals within the confines of externally imposed conditions.

THE NYANGIRE REBELLION OF 1907: ANTI-COLONIAL PROTEST AND THE NATIONALIST MYTH

Edward I. Steinhart

The past two decades have seen the rise and triumph of African nationalism in virtually the whole of the African continent north of the Zambesi River. Paralleling this has been the triumph of African nationalist historiography. Starting in the early 1960's, an interpretation of the history of modern Africa, which sees nationalism as a deeply-rooted and powerful force, became a major "school" of historical writing about Africa. This "school" has concentrated on explaining the social and political changes which transformed African societies during the colonial era, placing heavy emphasis on the continuity of certain pre-colonial African forms and on the role of African initiative in the transformation. The culmination of this transformation was the rush to African independence in the 1950's and 1960's led by professedly nationalist parties and movements. This climactic era provides the point from which earlier events have been viewed and interpreted by the "nationalist school."

However, after the first flush of nationalist triumph, there has been a period of stock-taking.[1] Africa south of the Zambesi remains white-ruled despite nationalist wars of liberation and speeches of denunciation. Independent African states have often fallen prey to the hawks of civil war, military coup and economic and social stagnation. Is African nationalism proving a weak reed because its roots do not penetrate so very far into the past? If nationalism is not the forceful creature we saw struggling to emerge in the 1950's, perhaps our interpretations of the roots of nationalism in African history need to be

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[1] See I. Wallerstein's personal stock-taking in "Looking Back at African Independence Ten Years Later," Africa Today, Vol. 18, No. 2 (1971), pp. 2-5.

re-examined, to say nothing of our interpretation of the nature and strength of nationalism in contemporary Africa.

This is especially true of the history of early African resistance and protest movements, which have been a special concern of the "nationalist school." The failure of the nationalist interpretation in the post-independence era threatens to leave an interpretative void in the growing scholarship on protest. In the following essay, I hope to examine some of the failings of the nationalist interpretation of protest, first by examining the views of the school and second by a case study in anti-colonial protest: The Nyangire Rebellion of 1907 in Bunyoro, Uganda. From these I will attempt to suggest a new hypothesis on the nature of protest in colonial Africa to fill the threatened void.

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The announcement of the theme of resistance and protest as a major concern of African historians[1] came as no surprise and found an immediate audience and warm response among scholars and the general public. 1970 in a sense saw the high water mark of the protest theme with the publication of a massive tome of protest studies edited by Dr. Mazrui and Dr. Rotberg.[2] This volume of diverse studies has collected both the nationalist and what we might call para-nationalist points of view in a collection which as Mazrui has suggested will be a "primary source of thought and illumination on protest as a social fact in Africa. . ."[3] for some time to come.

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[1] "Introduction" to Emerging Themes in African History, edited by T.O. Ranger (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968), xvii-xviii.

[2] R.I. Rotberg and A.A. Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, Oxford University Press, 1970).

[3] Ibid., p. 1195.

Nonetheless, even in this recent statement of the literature of protest, we can discern some discomfort with details of the interpretative apparatus of the "nationalist school." But, such criticisms as Mazrui and Rotberg raise are indirect and tangential, leaving the body of nationalist thought intact.[1]

A direct challenge to the nationalist literature of protest has been aimed at the so-called "Dar es Salaam school" by two South African scholars, Dr. Donald Denoon and Dr. Adam Kuper. These authors have very forcefully argued against what they believe to be "ideological history," which "has adopted the political philosophy of current African nationalism, and has used it to inform the study of African history."[2] While I believe their criticism is well aimed, it leaves us asking how distorted is our view of African protest and what kind of corrective lens can we apply?

The attack on the "Dar es Salaam school" has been aimed at several representatives of that school in a rather ad hominem fashion. The targets included those who have worked on subjects other than anti-colonial protest, such as archaeology and pre-colonial history.[3] In contrast, I will concentrate on making the argument that a major failing of the "nationalist school" has been its misinterpretation of anti-colonial manifestations as nationalist or proto-nationalist in sentiment, while disregarding or deflating other sources of anti-colonial feeling and ideology.

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[1] Cf. my review in Ufahamu II, 1,

[2] D. Denoon and A. Kuper, "Nationalist Historians in Search of a Nation," African Affairs Vol. 69, No. 277 (1970), pp. 329-349.

[3] Cf. the attack on A. D. Roberts, ed., Tanzania Before 1900 (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968) and on A. Temu and I. Kimambo, eds., A History of Tanzania (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1969). Cf. M. Chanock, "Development and Change in the History of Malawi," Conference on the Early History of Malawi, Limbe, 1970, for a general critique of nationalist historiography in Malawi.

What is the view of the "nationalist school" on African protest movements? The first point to be made is that the nationalist historians insist upon a continuity of early protest through the colonial period, a continuity which connects early protest forms with later forms of agitation that we generally accept as mass nationalism.[1] Thus, the roots of nationalism are placed far in the past, at least coincidental with the first expressions of protest against colonial overrule. The emphasis is on the deepness of the roots of African nations and the growth of popular participation in movements of protest, which culminated in the organization and success of nationalist parties and movements.[2] Anti-colonial protest is thus equated with nascent feelings of nationhood and the creation of institutions of national scale and identification. It is this "myth of nationalism" which has come under attack by both politicians and scholars, who have upheld the ultimate utility of objective scholarship.[3] While objective scholarship is readily applauded, it is not in itself a substitute for an interpretation of the nature of protest which can accommodate the diverse empirical data without theoretical banality.

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[1] T. O. Ranger, "Connexions between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa," Journal of African History, IX, 3 and 4 (1968), pp. 437-53, 631-41.

[2] J. M. Lonsdale, "Some Origins of Nationalism in East Africa," Journal of African History IX, 1 (1968), pp. 119-46; "The Emergence of African Nations," in Emerging Themes, T. O. Ranger, ed., pp. 201-17.

[3] Cf. Denoon and Kuper, "Nationalist Historians," pp. 346-48.

There are two basic pitfalls of the nationalist interpretation of protest. One has already been anticipated by Dr. Ranger when he briefly recognized that "African resistance, in the sense of movements similar to those categorized as 'primary resistance' movements, has taken the form of protest against dominance or sub-imperialism by other African peoples."[1] Moreover, Ranger also notes that "traditions of resistance can sometimes be used against nationalist movements as well as by them." However, this somewhat embarrassing fact is dismissed in a call for further investigation of "the whole question of African resistance to African pressures."[2] The whole question not only deserves investigation, but it may well require that we rethink the problem of resistance and protest and its implications for later social and political movements. If protest and "primary resistance" can and are directed against not only aliens who have come to dominate, but even against "domestic" forms of oppression, then perhaps protest must be viewed as something other than the expression of national aspirations for "self-government and self-expression as groups."[3] To interpret protest as proto-nationalism when it is recognized to include protest against non-aliens for reasons which are generated independently of--or in hostility to--ideals of national solidarity may be an exercise in wishful hindsight and historically unjustifiable. In the case of Nyangire, incipient Ugandan nationalism seems to me to have played no part in sparking organized opposition to colonial power.[4] Moreover, while the sub-nationalism (particularism) of Bunyoro was a potent force, the motive force and cause of protest feelings is something more subtle still.

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[1] Ranger, "Connexions, II," p. 639.

[2] Ibid., p. 638

[3] Rotberg and Mazrui, Protest, xvii.

[4] Contrast the hyper-nationalism of G.N. Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907," University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference, Nairobi, 1969, pp.129-70. Uzoigwe explicitly cites the inspiration of Ranger for his own interpretation, p. 162.

There is yet a second pitfall of the "Dar es Salaam school:" a tendency to ignore or misrepresent responses to colonial intrusion which do not conform to the themes of resistance and protest. It has been suggested that the nationalist historians, in their enthusiasm for "the genuine importance and formidable energy"[1] of the nationalist movements, have tended to ignore the phenomena of collaboration with the establishment of colonial overrule.[2]

The contention that nationalist historiography ignores primary collaboration, i.e., collaboration with the establishment of colonial regimes by members of African societies under the pressures of imperial invasion, must be somewhat refined. It is, I believe, largely true that the "Dar es Salaam school" has systematically avoided considering the role of African collaboration in the establishment of colonial rule in East and Central Africa. This, it might be contended, stems from their legitimate concentration on the important movements of resistance and rebellion which have taken place, particularly the Maji-Maji uprising studied by Dr. Iliffe and Dr. Gwassa and the Shona-Ndebele revolt studied by Dr. Ranger.[3] Yet, even

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[1] Ranger, ed., Emerging Themes, xxi.

[2] E. Steinhart, "Primary Collaboration in Ankole," University of East Africa Social Science Council Conference, 1968-69, History Papers (Kampala, Makerere Institute of Social Research, n.d.), pp. 191-97.

[3] J. Iliffe, Tanganyika under German Rule 1905-1912 (Cambridge, University Press, 1969); J. Iliffe and G. Gwassa, Records of the Maji-Maji Uprising, Historical Association of Tanzania Paper No. 4 (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1968); J. Iliffe, "The Organization of the Maji-Maji Rebellion," Journal of African History VIII, 3 (1957), pp. 495-512; G. Gwassa, "The German Intervention and African Resistance in Tanzania," in A. Temu and I. Kimambo, History of Tanzania (Nairobi, East African Publishing House, 1969); T. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897 (London, Heinemann, 1967).

the treatment of defection and submission as aspects of these rebellions seems to have been minimized. Moreover, except for A. D. Roberts' early and singular article on Ganda sub-imperialism in Uganda,[1] and despite Ranger's call for the investigation of "African resistance to African pressure," there have been no studies of collaboration or the African opposition to collaboration by affiliates of the "Dar school."

But, the major reason that collaboration has appeared as an ignored or submerged theme among the nationalist historians has been a tendency to avoid the use of collaboration as a descriptive term and to completely eschew the term collaborators for characterizing Africans engaged in cooperative action with the colonial regimes. The highly colored and political origins of that term in the European context of non-resistance to Fascism can be used to justify this systematic avoidance. But, the complementary tendency to describe collaboration in the African context as accommodation or even modernization and to describe the African actors as modernizers or communicators has served to distort the nature of the response of collaboration by using terms loaded in an opposite direction. Instead of the condemnatory term of collaboration with its overtones of moral corruption and political self-seeking, we are confronted with essentially laudatory terms which emphasize (not coincidentally) the contribution of the collaborators to developing the conditions for the emergence of "nationalist movements." Dr. Lonsdale's communicators are explicitly the precursors of the later colonial communicators, the "nationalist elite."[2] And the modernizers

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[1] A. Roberts, "The Sub-Imperialism of Buganda," Journal of African History III 3 (1962), pp. 435-50.

[2] Lonsdale, "Some Origins," pp. 121 ff. A useful contrast is I. Henderson, "The Origins of Nationalism in East and Central Africa: the Zambian Case," Journal of African History XI, 4, (1970), pp. 591-603.

of the journal, Tarikh, even when they are simultaneously resisters, are portrayed as prophets of national independence through selective adaptation.[1] Again, "African nationalism" and its triumph have cast a long shadow back, darkening our understanding of African behavior in both the colonial and immediate pre-colonial eras.

To let some light fall upon the nature of African initiatives and responses in the early colonial context, we will have to develop a far more subtle understanding of the nature of protest and collaboration than is allowed if we accept the nationalist contentions about protest as proto-nationalism and collaboration as modernization. But, before we can proceed to suggest a framework for such a new understanding of African responses, we must attempt to bury the wounded, but still dangerous, nationalist hypothesis. In aid of this, we move now to a case study of a rebellion which fits few of the nationalist criteria for African responses and which may provoke some inkling of a subtler ingredient in the nature of early colonial protest.

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"The conspiracy had been marked with such able organization and recusancy for a long period so quietly and persistently sustained as to stamp it with the suspicion of non-native guidance."[2] So wrote the British colonial administrator, George Wilson, shortly after the suppression of the Nyangire Rebellion and the arrest of 54 of its African

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[1] "Modernisers in Africa," Tarikh I, 4 (1967).

[2] Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, E[ntebbe] S[ecretariat] A[rchives] SMP 710/07.

leaders. Wilson's long experience with Nyoro and Uganda politics makes it difficult to dismiss his suspicions of "outside agitators" as mere racist and reactionary hallucinations. Yet there is no evidence whatsoever to sustain the suspicion that non-Banyoro organized or promoted the protest movement against colonial and Baganda overrule. What made Wilson suspicious and how in fact was this anti-colonial protest movement really generated?

In February, 1907, various Nyoro chiefs began to plan to evict their Ganda co-chiefs from the positions to which they had come in the previous half decade.[1] By March, a public refusal of cooperation drove the Baganda from the Nyoro villages to the protection of the British officials at Hoima, the capital. Confronted with direct orders to allow the Baganda chiefs to resettle, the Nyoro chiefs refused pointblank to reinstate the Baganda. Nyangire Abaganda, as the manifestation is remembered, means, "I have refused the Baganda." The Nyoro chiefs and their followers gathered at the capital and persisted in refusing to allow the Baganda to return to their posts. Finally, on May 16, 1907, with police reinforcements on hand and prompted by fears for the safety of the Ganda chiefs, the decision was taken by Wilson himself to break up the "frenzied" demonstrations and arrest those chiefs at the capital. No one was killed during the "rebellion," and violence against property was restricted to the outlying areas where the huts of Ganda chiefs were burned. A strictly constitutional agitation by means of civil disobedience aimed at the redress of specific grievances had pushed the colonial administration to the

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[1] For vernacular accounts of the events of the rebellion, see J. Nyakatura, Abakama ba Bunyoro-Kitara (Canada, St. Justin's Press, 1947), p. 219 and L. A. Katyanku and S. Bulera Obwomezi Bw' Omukama Duhaga II (Kampala, Eagle Press, 1950), cyclostyled translation by Andrew Kigere-Kavuma, pp. 18-20.

point of counter violence. What were the grievances of the Banyoro which underlay the protest?

Bunyoro, unlike the three other kingdoms of the Uganda Protectorate, was a conquered province. No treaty or agreement regulated or formalized the relations between the government of Bunyoro and the Protectorate Government of British officials. The conquest of Bunyoro was begun in 1891 when Captain Frederick Lugard, acting for the Imperial British East Africa Company and in alliance with the ruling group in the Buganda kingdom, invaded western Uganda and succeeded in severing Bunyoro's southernmost counties and establishing a puppet regime in what became the Toro kingdom. In 1893 a major military campaign was launched against the Mukama Kabarega by the new Protectorate regime in Buganda. Acting in the interest of Buganda's security and with a view to gaining control of the Nile headwaters, Colonel Colvile, the British commander, succeeded in capturing Kabarega's capital and establishing a military occupation. Kabarega was eventually driven from his kingdom to exile north of the Nile where he organized and led a guerrilla resistance which ended only with the Mukama's capture in 1899.[1] It was Uganda's most protracted and heroic resistance and a likely subject of nationalist mythology and historical attention.

From 1895 a new regime of collaboration was emerging in the rump of the Bunyoro kingdom coincident with Kabarega's resistance. The severance of Toro in 1891 had been followed by the alienation of large tracts of central Bunyoro to Ganda chiefs as a reward for their participation in Bunyoro's

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[1] See E. Steinhart, "Transition in Western Uganda: 1891-1901," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, pp. 116-73.

conquest and in the hopes of settling Buganda's own turbulent religious situation.[1] Only the northernmost counties of the old kingdom were left to be administered by Nyoro chiefs. A young son of Kabarega's was proclaimed Mukama by the British authorities in 1898 in the hope of gaining a semblance of legitimacy for the regime of collaboration. With Kabarega's capture and exile in 1899 the path lay open for the de facto elaboration of a new regime with new personnel under British guidance and protection, a regime which de jure was a British creation as the victor claiming the spoils.

The British conviction that the Banyoro were both hostile to progress and incapable of efficient government led to the introduction of Baganda chiefs as tutors to the regime of collaboration. Everywhere in Uganda "progress" in administration and Christian religion was linked to the arrival of the agents of Buganda's sub-imperialism. But in Bunyoro it took a unique and particularly irritating form. Not only were vast areas of Bunyoro territory lying between the two kingdoms simply annexed to Buganda in the wake of the conquest, but even within the rump of Nyoro territory Baganda chiefs were set over Banyoro chiefs in order to teach them the arts of administration, à la Buganda.

In 1901, upon petition from the Nyoro chiefs charged with running the local administration, the Ganda chief, James Miti, was established as a chief in Bunyoro.[2] Miti and his following had a profound impact on Nyoro government. At first, it would appear that these men, particularly Miti, were well received by the Banyoro, or at least by the Nyoro

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[1] A. D. Roberts, "The 'Lost Counties' of Bunyoro," Uganda Journal xxvi, 2, (1962), pp. 194-99.

[2] P. Lwanga, Obulamu Bw'omutaka J.K. Miti Kabazzi (Kampala, Friends Press, n.d.) and Wilson to Jackson, 14 Aug. 1901, ESA, A12/1. Ms. translation by Wm. Mukasa, pp. 1-11.

political elite. Miti assisted in drafting a new territorial arrangement which regularized the chiefly hierarchy and confirmed various Nyoro chiefs and sub-chiefs in their titles and positions. This arrangement very much resembled the division of responsibility enacted by the formal agreements with Bunyoro's lacustrine neighbors, Ankole and Toro, except for the absence of landed estates granted to the title holders. Bunyoro, as a conquered territory, was not privileged to have chiefly freehold tenure introduced at this point.[1]

However, the chiefs had little room for complaint as it was clear that they governed at the sufferance of the colonial authorities. This was even true of the Mukama, Kitahimbwa, the son of Kabarega who was enthroned by British fiat in 1898. Both Miti and the collaborating chiefs, led by the Nyoro chief of Bugahya county, Paulo Byabacwezi, found Kitahimbwe difficult to work with in the governing council. In 1902 the chiefs petitioned the colonial regime for his removal and were obliged by the appointment of a new Mukama, an older son of Kabarega's who became Andereye Duhaga II. Miti especially was quick to gain the confidence of the new monarch and become effective ruler of the council and the country. This in turn led to increasing numbers of Ganda agents entering service in Bunyoro hoping by that means to advance their careers as colonial administrators.[2]

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[1]See Steinhart, thesis, pp. 192-208.

[2]Tomkins to Commissioner, 16 Oct. 1902, ESA A12/2 and Interviews B/34, Princess Alexandria Komukyeya, 11 November 1968, and B/3 Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968.

As early as June, 1902, the district officer noted "the very bad feeling that exists between the Ynyoro [sic] chiefs, and those who have been brought from Uganda and elsewhere, and put in charge of some of the counties!"[1] While the eruption was still five years away, the roots of the disturbance in the fears among the Banyoro that their kingdom would be taken from them by piecemeal annexation or expropriation by Baganda chiefs "as was the case in Bugangaidzi and Buyaga," the "lost counties," were already evident. Moreover, the condition of the peasantry in the "lost counties" had even in 1902 become the source of real grievance, with Nyoro cultivators attempting to move from under the Ganda chiefs to escape harsh treatment.[2] Thus, the basic grievance over the presence of the Ganda chiefs and the treatment they gave their Nyoro underlings was present virtually from the onset of Ganda sub-imperialism.

This grievance was intensified by the fears that the Ganda would eventually take over full authority in Bunyoro. And the notion was not as far fetched as it might appear. As late as December, 1904, the local colonial official recommended to his superiors "the employment of carefully selected Waganda" as chiefs. It was his contention that in matters of the cultivation of cash crops in particular that these Baganda would "give more favorable results than are at present obtained by the apathetic, unreliable and

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[1] Tomkins to Commissioner 16 June 1902, ESA A12/2.

[2] Bagge to Commissioner 16 May 1902, ESA A12/2 and interview B/10, Metushera Katuramu, 21 October 1968.

untrustworthy Wanyoro."[1] In this fear it is safe to recognize a certain community of interest between the Nyoro chiefs and the Nyoro cultivators. Thus, while the inarticulate bakopi (common man) was not in the forefront of protest, his opposition to Ganda overrule can be seen in the attempted migration from the "lost counties" and in a curious crisis which developed in 1904.

At that time, a new district officer took it on his own authority to cancel the labor services owed to the chiefs by the bakopi as he felt it interfered with the bakopi cultivation of their own gardens. There was an immediate outcry from among the chiefs, including the Mukama Duhaga. Administrative action was necessary, argued the district officer, as the "peasantry," who had "become little more than slaves ready to work for the chiefs when ordered" feared that their complaints would be cause for further prestations when they came before the governing council dominated as it was by Miti. Despite the humanitarian impulse and the recognition of the legitimacy of some of the bakopi grievances, the labor services were quickly restored.[2] It was decided to uphold the "properly constituted authority" of the chiefs. Although the chiefs were lacking in education, he said, "the peasantry require discipline in even greater degree."[3] Some

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[1] Fowler to Wilson, 31 December 1904, ESA A12/5.

[2] Prendergast to Commissioner, n.d., 10 January 1904 and 8 February 1904, ESA A12/5.

[3] Wilson to Commissioner, 10 March 1904, ESA A12/5. These events are described as a "rebellion" by Katyanku and Bulera, Obwomezi, p. 18.

adjustments were suggested such as the keeping of labor rolls by chiefs and the right of appeal from the council to the local colonial officer, but I think it can be agreed that "peasant" grievances against chiefly authority, particularly the authority of the alien chiefs, was a constant factor underlying the rebellion of 1907.

At the time of the dispute over labor services, the chiefs had intended to petition the colonial authority for salaries and estates like those obtained by the chiefs of Buganda. The dispute over labor prestations temporarily delayed their appeal.[1] However, by 1905 new arrangements on the rights and responsibilities of chiefs were being made and were promulgated in 1906 as the System of Chieftaincy in Unyoro, 1906.[2] While the Nyoro chiefs seem to have been satisfied with the arrangements at the time, they contained the seeds of some discord. First, no private estates were allotted under the new system. By this time the Nyoro chiefs were well aware of the differences between themselves and the chiefs of the neighboring kingdoms, but that did little to soften the resentment. By late 1906 the Nyoro chiefs had petitioned unsuccessfully for private lands.[3]

Secondly, there was a marked increase in the territorial authority of both James Miti and Mika Fataki, a Musoga by birth but allied to the Ganda influence in Bunyoro. This too seems to have exacerbated the fears of the Nyoro chiefs and possibly heightened the incipient rivalry between Byabacwezi, the leading Nyoro chief, and Miti, the leading alien chief within the governing council.

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[1] Wilson to Commissioner 10 May 1904, ESA A12/5.

[2] Unyoro Chiefs, Grant of Estates to, ESA SMP 1019/06, includes the correspondence of land grants and the text of the "System of Chieftaincy in Unyoro, 1906."

[3] Minute by H. Bell, 31 October 1906, ESA SMP 1019/06.

Indeed, the growth of Miti's direct territorial authority and his growing influence over the monarch seem to be the main sources of grievance among the Nyoro ruling elite. It is this last phenomenon which, in addition to producing the rivalry between Miti and Byabacwezi as arch-collaborator, seems to have alienated a large number of the Royal Bito dynasty from the rule of Duhaga. Criticism of Duhaga for allowing the Ganda to gain a foothold (although Miti himself was invited to Bunyoro before Duhaga was made Mukama) and for granting too much power to his Ganda advisors was a prevalent theme among Duhaga's numerous Bito kinsmen. How much was sincere objection to Duhaga's failure to exercise royal authority and how much self-seeking opportunism among potential candidates for Duhaga's throne is difficult to say. But there is evidence to indicate that both forces were at work among the Bito clansmen.[1]

To this list of injuries must be added the insult of Ganda cultural imperialism. The use of Luganda as the official language of state and church may have rankled from the onset of Ganda influence. However, when the C.M.S. missionary in Bunyoro, A.B. Fisher, wrote a letter to the missionary in Toro, Henry Maddox, on the subject of encouraging the use of Luganda, he triggered off more than he knew. The letter, in arguing for the retention of Luganda in church affairs, pointed up the growth of

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[1]Interviews B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968 and B/24 Z.K. Winyi and Z. K. Mugenyi, 2 November 1968.

Ganda influence sponsored by the Ganda chiefs in Bunyoro.[1] Maddox, a proponent of local language use, particularly in translating the Bible to make it as widely available as possible to the agricultural classes, read the letter aloud to the Toro Church Council. The council, composed of many of the important Toro chiefs, had direct connections to the Nyoro chiefly hierarchy. We can assume that word passed very quickly from the Toro chiefs, who had fought a considerable struggle to secure both their political and cultural independence from Buganda, to the Nyoro chiefs, who were prompted to begin their own struggle to rid themselves of Ganda influence.[2]

Thus, at every level of Bunyoro's political hierarchy -- from the bakopi peasant cultivators suffering under the sting of new taxes and labor prestations through the Nyoro sub-chiefs and chiefs jealous of the growing influence of their Ganda co-chiefs to the royal dynasty itself -- grievances against the colonial system which had introduced the Baganda to Nyoro politics were rampant. In February, 1907, the rebellion began when the Nyoro chiefs came forward to express their protest at the unhappy state of affairs in the kingdom.

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[1] Fisher to Maddox, Christmas 1905, Fisher Correspondence, Microfilm Makerere Library.

[2] Thanks to Dr. Louise Pirouet for suggesting this interpretation based on her work in mission history, for the Department of Religions, Makerere University. See Steinhart, thesis, pp. 103-08 for Toro's cultural resistance.

The rebellion itself can be said to have begun in early February, 1907, when in the absence of James Miti from the Lukiko or governing council, a new spirit of protest and defiance arose. Miti, through his "undue influence over the Mukama and thus over the Lukiko generally,"[1] had come to dominate the political life of the court. It is of some significance that the voice of protest was first raised while he was away in Buganda. Suspicion that Miti was recruiting more Baganda for service in Bunyoro may lie behind the talk of a Baganda conspiracy to oust the Nyoro title holders.[2] In any case, Miti's absence provided "a much desired opportunity to speak out." At this stage, the protest remained strictly verbal and confined to the Lukiko, but the major themes of the rebellion were clearly articulated: anti-alien and anti-authoritarian feelings began to be voiced.

According to the British officer, Cubitt:[3]

> . . . the chief reason for this burst of feeling against the Waganda lies in the fact that the Mukama and chiefs asked H. E. the Commissioner if they could be given official and private miles (estates) and the Wanyoro are afraid that a lot of their land will be handed over to the Waganda.

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[1] Cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[2] Nyakatura, Abakama, p. 219.

[3] Cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. Cf. Interview B/3, Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968.

While Cubitt tended to dismiss such fears as groundless, the fact that the leading chiefs, including the alien chiefs led by Miti, had petitioned the government for extensive grants of freehold land late in 1906 provided a major threat to the Nyoro cultivators and minor chiefs. It would be well to note that Cubitt's report speaks of the protestors as "Batongole," a Ganda term referring not only to the senior chiefs on the Lukiko, but to lesser chiefs who, while they were Lukiko councilors, would not have shared in the distribution of land grants. If freehold tenure had been introduced at this time as it had been earlier in Buganda, it might well have created a class of landed oligarchs whose economic control of land and political power reinforced each other. This would have created a monopoly of power from which the Nyoro populace and the minor chiefs would suffer. Thus, an anti-authoritarian element can be seen in the attempts to thwart the senior chiefs, including the alien chiefs, from gaining a permanent foothold in Bunyoro and vastly increasing their power by becoming landlords as well as chiefs.

But, it was the anti-alien theme which came to predominate in Nyoro motivation. Miti's position as a Muganda chief focused their anti-authoritarian complaints. Originally, he had been invited to Bunyoro to teach the Nyoro chiefs how to rule. In his wake had come an influx of Baganda into the country, who as friends and followers of Miti had found themselves comfortable and often lucrative positions in the conquered province. They came as petty traders, evangelists, and eventually as minor chiefs and headmen, bringing with them a cultural arrogance, commercial and religious attitudes, and a desire for authority which was not calculated to win friends

among the Nyoro population. They began turning out the "rightful landholders" and assuming power at a grassroots level. Another complaint was "that the Waganda have brought nothing into the country, and that all the profits that they get they send over to (B)Uganda, thus impoverishing (B)Unyoro and enriching (B)Uganda. . ."[1] It is not difficult to see the formation of stereotyping of the alien exploiters which preceded the outburst of feeling against them. Both elements of anti-Ganda and anti-authoritarian protest were symbolically united in the protest against the twenty or so Baganda chiefs and in this Miti himself provided a perfect target.

But, the groundswell of resentment against the chiefs was quickly channeled. The chief reason for the protest, the fear of land grants, was reduced to the fear of alienation of land and loss of authority to the alien intruders. In this the Nyoro senior chiefs were able to join. While the minor chiefs started the manifestations, it was the senior chiefs, Paulo Byabacwezi, Leo Kaboha and Katalikawe, who began to organize the protest to bring it to the next stage: the explusion of the Ganda chiefs.[2] By siding with the dissidents, the senior chiefs were able to channel the anti-authoritarian resentment into more narrowly anti-alien protest, which still struck a responsive chord among the Nyoro populace. By early March, 1907, the Baganda were being driven out of the countryside by the threat of violence from the Nyoro "peasantry" and were seeking refuge at Hoima, the capital.[3]

The British response to the expulsion of the Baganda was remarkably unimaginative. While Cubitt initially felt that the protest might be

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Nakiwafu to Jemusi (Miti) Kago, 6 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[3] Fataki to Apolo Kagwa Katikiro, 7 March 1907 (trans.) ESA SMP 267/07.

viewed as an opportunity for allowing the Nyoro chiefs to govern under threat that any "regressive movement" would be handled by bringing the Baganda back,[1] Wilson, as Deputy Commissioner, insisted on upholding the letter of the law. He advised the district officer "to nip in the bud any attempt to interfere with the scheme of chieftainships proposed by the Lukiko and confirmed by the Commissioner according to the book published. . ." in 1906[2]. Unhappy with the way Cubitt was handling the situation, Wilson dispatched another officer, Tomkins, who arrived in early April.[3] But, Tomkins arrived bearing instructions to strictly enforce the system of chieftaincy "according to the book." Despite the statements of Byabacwezi that he and Kaboha had only "signed as they feared to do otherwise, and the Mukama did what Jamusi [Miti] told him," Tomkins was unable to retreat to a flexible solution to the crisis.[4]

Tomkins called a Baraza of all the senior chiefs and reminded them of the system of chieftaincy which had been agreed to by the chiefs and the Protectorate government. To the Nyoro chiefs' pleas of duress in their signing the agreement were added the catalogue of complaints against the the Ganda chiefs and Miti in particular. Tomkins reported that the "great point with the Bunyoro chiefs is that they should be allowed to rule their own country as the chiefs of Toro, (B)Uganda, Ankole, etc., are allowed to do."[5] While this was not the great point of the Nyoro populace or of the

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[1]Cubitt to Deputy Commissioner, 21 February 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[2]Wilson to Collector, Hoima (telegram) 13 March 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[3]Tomkins to Deputy Commissioner (telegram) 7 April 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[4]Tomkins to Deputy Commissioner, 15 April 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[5]Ibid.

lesser chiefs, it was a point which seems to have convinced Tomkins of the justice of the Nyoro case.

By May there was no longer any time for continued protest. The Ganda chiefs had been thoroughly driven out of the country and were waiting in Hoima to be reinstated. Some huts had been burned, but no violence against persons had taken place. Still Wilson insisted on a hard line and Eden, the new district officer, called a Baraza and put it to the chiefs: They must reinstate the Baganda or risk losing their own positions. Even if the reinstatement were only temporary, subject to the government's review of the Nyoro grievances, it was the only term the Protectorate government would consider. On May 7 the order to reinstate the Baganda was read to the assembled chiefs, who refused to cooperate, contending that even if they were willing the bakopi or "peasants" could not be persuaded and wanted the Baganda expelled.[1] This the government considered an excuse. Apparently the absence of personal violence had convinced them already that this was a well-organized and controlled demonstration out of keeping with European stereotypes of African emotionalism and violent tendencies.[2]

Two more barazas on the 8th and 9th of May saw the Nyoro chiefs remain adamant, but calm, in their refusal to allow the Baganda to return to their villages even on a temporary basis. On the 9th Eden announced a four-day ultimatum after which if the Nyoro chiefs persisted in refusing they would jeopardize their positions. But, when Wilson's hard line was reiterated after the four-day grace, the Nyoro chiefs who had been assembled at the

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[1] Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Miti, pp. 50-51.

[2] Wilson to Spires, 28 May 1907, and Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

Post Office in Hoima not only refused but did so in loud and "passionate" terms. Two days later, May 16, the chiefs were again assembled, again refused, and this time, following the orders of Deputy Commissioner Wilson, fifty-four of the assembled rebels were arrested. This number included the names of senior and minor chiefs and important personages including many members of the royal Bito clan.[1]

Throughout the disturbances, the Mukama hewed to a neutral line. He insisted that he personally did not want the Baganda to leave, but that his chiefs were the motive force for expulsion. His failure to assume leadership in the protest has been laid to a weakness of character and the influence of his Baganda and missionary advisors. A more charitable view sees him in full support of the rebellion, but shrewdly avoiding a situation which would jeopardize his authority and his throne.[2] In support of this contention, it is not unlikely that the Baganda leadership in Kampala coveted an even more direct subjugation of Bunyoro and might well have aimed at placing a member of the Ganda royal family on the Nyoro throne. In that light, Duhaga's neutrality may well have served to preserve not only his own position, but it may have saved the Nyoro dynasty and the peace of the country as well.[3]

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[1] Lwanga, Miti, pp. 51-52, and Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, and Wilson to Elgin, 25 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07. Cf. Interview B/19, Isaya Bikundi, 30 October 1968. See Uzoigwe, "The Kyanyangire, 1907," pp. 149-59, for a detailed account of the events.

[2] Interviews B/3 Martin Mukidi, 13 October 1968, and B/34, Princess Alexandria Komukyeya, 11 November 1968.

[3] Ibid., and Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga, pp. 19-20.

Of the senior chiefs, Byabacwezi, who was considered by Eden as the ringleader, managed to escape arrest. In fact, Byabacwezi appears to have wavered and to have been pushed into a hard line position by his co-chief, Leo Kaboha, and particularly by his sub-chiefs. Byabacwezi was prepared to surrender to the British pressure were it not for fear of loss of popular support. It was reported that Byabacwezi had verbally agreed to the ultimatum on the 14th day of May, but on telling his sub-chiefs this was derided into continued resistance. It was "better to suffer with the rest and have the good opinion of others. Byabacwezi is said to have cried and to have decided to be a martyr rather than a turn-coat. . ."[1]

It is the crucial role of the sub-chiefs that is deserving of note. Ibrahim Talyeba, the deputy (mumyoka) sub-chief under Miti, played a very prominent part in organizing the disturbances and in persuading Byabacwezi to persist. Daudi Bitaluli, the deputy to Byabacwezi, was also among the leaders arrested.[2] Pressure from the leading sub-chiefs may well have been motivated by jealousy at the growth of Baganda titleholding which excluded them from the senior positions. The large number of Babito among the sub-chiefs raises the question of the role of dynastic intrigue, possibly against Duhaga and favoring a restoration of Kabarega, then in his eighth year of exile. In any case, it was believed by the district officer, Eden,[3] and would appear from the numbers of sub-chiefs arrested,

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[1]Haddon to Collector, Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

[2]Interviews B/44, Yesse T. Kinimi, 3 December 1968, and B/12, Nebayosi Tibangwa, 22 October 1968. These men are the sons of Talyeba and Bitatuli respectively

[3]Eden to Wilson, 11 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

that it was the second rank of Nyoro chiefs who initiated, organized and sustained the constitutional agitation and protest which Wilson could not believe was of local African authorship. While the British officials discounted the allegation by the chiefs that the bakopi were hostile to the Baganda and would kill them if they returned to the villages, the role of both Bito and commoner sub-chiefs in the agitation lends credence to the contention that popular discontent with the growth of alien influence and the resulting social uncertainty was a powerful force in sustaining the "rebellion" by the chiefs.

As a side note, the highly politically conscious nature of the rebellion as a constitutional protest can be illustrated by a unique maneuver by the Nyoro chiefs. During the disturbances envoys were sent to the neighboring kingdoms of Toro and Ankole and to Busoga and the "lost counties" in the hopes of finding allies there who might extend the anti-Ganda rebellion throughout the Ganda dominated provinces.[1] Such an attempt to increase the pressure on the British to remove the Baganda chiefs by seeking a multi-tribal, albeit single issue, organization shows a political wisdom which we tend to identify with only the more modern of the African protest movements. The agitation for the return of the "lost counties," which Wilson for one believed was the object of the entire exercise, spread to that district and required the presence of a police force under Apolo Kagwa, the Prime Minister of Buganda, to insure the "Pax Brittanica."[2]

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[1] Isemonger to Wilson, 18 June 1907, ESA SMP 267/07. Cf. Haddon to Collector, Unyoro, 19 May 1907, ESA SMP 267/07.

[2] Lwanga, Miti, p. 53. Kagwa before being diverted to the "lost counties" had been en route to Bunyoro in the company of a Ganda prince lending credibility to the suspicion of a Ganda conspiracy to undermine Nyoro "sovereignty." Cf. Katyanku and Bulera, Duhaga, p. 19.

Deputy Commissioner Wilson arrived at Hoima on May 22, 1907, with police and military reinforcements. Unhappy at the handling of the disturbances by the local officers, he felt that prolonged confrontation even after the arrest of over fifty agitators might well lead to violence against the Baganda still at Hoima. It was his purpose to put a quick finish to the spirit of rebellion. A new round of barazas was begun with Wilson presiding.[1]

On the 27th day of May judgment was handed down by Wilson. His awards reflect his prejudices and the element of necessity in colonial efforts to secure peaceful subordination. The four Nyoro senior chiefs implicated in the rebellion were most unevenly punished. Leo Kaboha was deposed from his chieftaincy and exiled to Buganda.[2] Katalikawe was deposed and forfeited one-third of his land holdings. Daudi Katongole lost one-third of his estates and two years of tax revenues.[3] Byabacwezi, who most of the British believed was the prime mover in the rebellion, lost a third of his estates and was fined 500 to be paid within two years. The fine was later reduced. Moreover, whatever debts were due to him from the Protectorate government for a decade of service in establishing the regime of collaboration were considered as wiped out.[4] All in all, his penalties were not harsh. One wonders if leniency flowed from Wilson's merciful qualities and from the recognition of past services or if it

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[1] Lwanga, Miti, pp. 53-54, and Wilson to Elgin, 25 June, 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

[2] Wilson, "Award," 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interviews B/4., Pancras Kaboha, 25 November 1968 and B/42, William Kaboha, 26 November 1968.

[3] Wilson, "Award," 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Interview B/19, Isaya Bikundi, 30 October 1968.

[4] Ibid.

resulted from a calculated realization of the importance of Byabacwezi to the functioning of any system of indirect rule and collaboration in Bunyoro.

All those arrested on May 16 when the baraza threatened to erupt into violence were to be removed to Buganda.[1] Twelve of these fifty-four were eventually deported from Uganda entirely. This number included Leo Kaboha, but was made up essentially of the most vocal agitators among the sub-chiefs. It was on these men that the penalties fell most heavily, complaints being received that their property was being confiscated and their wives and children were being driven off their estates.[2]

A word of sympathy was appended to the Award for the bakopi, whom Wilson felt had "not been deeply implicated." Even after the events, a realistic assessment of the role of popular support for the anti-Ganda and anti-authoritarian movement was not possible for the architects of British colonial overrule. The myth of a quiescent peasantry had to be preserved.[3]

The last section of the award reads:[4]

> The Unyoro chiefs, who are Baganda, are to be at once installed by a Government officer with proper impressiveness and with a fitting force. They will not be installed as Baganda but as Unyoro chiefs, who were removed from their posts in violation of the law.

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[1] Ibid., and Manara to Wilson, 7 June 1907, ESA SMP 710/07.

[2] Various entries in "Deportation of Unyoro Chiefs," ESA SMP 1367/07.

[3] Cf. M. Weisser, personal communication, 24 March 1971, regarding a forthcoming paper on peasant crime in Spain.

[4] Wilson, "Award," 27 May 1907, ESA SMP 710/07 and Lwanga, Miti, pp. 54-56.

The Baganda were indeed restored and in that sense the rebellion was a failure and the losses to the Nyoro organizers were suffered for nought. The huts of two Ganda chiefs were burned the following year and tensions continued to be high for several years. As a result, no additional Ganda chiefs were appointed to positions in Bunyoro and those in office were eventually retired in favor of Nyoro successors.[1] Thus, a delayed and disguised success did attend this early protest movement against a form of colonial overrule. Nyangire, along with Kaberega's guerilla struggle of the previous decade, became a focus of Nyoro pride in the courage and defiance of their leaders. But, the "nationalist" pride of later generations does not establish the proto-nationalist motives of the early resisters and protesters. We must try to establish the nature of protest-generating sentiments without benefit of such hindsight and see where such sentiments might lead.

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That the Nyangire Rebellion was not proto-nationalist in its motivation or organization seems evident from the events described. While the anti-Ganda strain, which came to dominate the protest movement, can be seen as particularist or "tribalist," that, too, would be an over-simplification. Traditional antipathies were certainly present, but to emphasize them at the price of ignoring the real and pressing grievances against the facts of colonial oppression is to flatten the texture of Nyoro society in transition.[2] The fear of Ganda expropriation of land by the sub-chiefs,

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[1] Leakey to Deputy Commissioner, 31 January 1908 and 24 April 1908, ESA SMP C10/08; Eden, "Annual Report for 1911-12," p. 56, ESA SMP 2135.

[2] See Uzoigwe; "The Kyanyangire, 1907," while very richly documented, tends to treat the anti-alien sentiments and appeal to history as uniform among the various Nyoro classes, thus homogenizing Nyoro society for nationalist purposes.

the resentment against Ganda office holding by the senior chiefs, and the beginnings of hostility by the agricultural population against the agents of "modernization" (i.e., against bureaucratic and capitalist intervention into "traditional" social and political life) all fed the protest movement. Popular anti-authoritarianism and elite fear of social disruption fused with the protest against alien domination to propel the Nyoro people toward rebellion.

But, how can a rebellion by the Nyoro chiefs be called anti-authoritarian? Here we see the peculiar contradiction of the collaborating chiefs writ large. They were under pressure from below to champion the anti-colonial struggle and countervailing pressure to administer the colonial state. These cross pressures were most evident in the arch-collaborator Byabacwezi's ambivalence toward the struggle. But, the contradiction is also evidenced by the efforts of the collaborating Nyoro leadership to organize and direct the protest not against alien authority in general but against the Baganda aliens in particular. By identifying the exercise of illegitimate authority with the Ganda chiefs, the Nyoro chiefs were able to appear as the champions of popular anti-colonial sentiment without stirring anti-authoritarian feelings against themselves as colonial agents. They were thus able to harness popular revolutionary impulses to self-seeking and particularist programs which at base contradicted the impulses which propelled them.

If this is our interpretation of Nyangire, how can we relate it to other movements of anti-colonial protest or resistance? The answer, I believe, is that we must reinterpret the entire tradition of anti-colonial

protest from a perspective which allows us to see beyond the "nationalist" flowering of later anti-colonial movements to a profounder understanding of the roots of revolt.

Let me illustrate what must be done with an example from late colonial history in Kenya. Two reinterpretations of the Mau-Mau movement were published in the mid-1960's. By far the most influential is that of Rosberg and Nottingham in their The Myth of "Mau Mau," subtitled "Nationalism in Kenya."[1] Here we have made explicit the nationalist interpretation of anti-colonial uprisings. Mau-Mau is related to the development of nationalism in Kenya right back to the first resistance wars against the British invaders.[2] Thwarted politically, nationalist sentiment turns violent, but remains fundamentally nationalist. This view, which is infinitely preferable to the previous view of Mau-Mau as tribal atavism and savage frenzy, was quickly applauded by the nationalist historians of the "Dar es Salaam School."[3]

But, nationalism is not the only interpretation possible, nor, to my mind, the most useful. The same year which saw the publication of The Myth of "Mau Mau" also saw the release of Barnett and Njama's Mau-Mau

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[1] C. Rosberg and J. Nottingham, The Myth of "Mau Mau" (New York, Praeger, 1966).

[2] Ibid., pp. 7-16.

[3] J. Lonsdale, "New Perspectives in Kenya History," African Affairs Vol. 66, no. 265, pp. 348-53.

from Within.[1] As the title indicates, the perspective is what matters. For Barnett's interpretation of Njama's autobiography emphasized another element in the rebellion. Instead of the nationalist "communicators" as the focus of the rebellion, Barnett emphasizes the peasant partisans, the actual militants of the forest and mountains. From that perspective, i.e., from the bottom up, the roots of Mau-Mau lie not in nationalist organization but in the revolutionary, anti-authoritarian impulses of the African "peasantry." Such a view accords far better with the interpretation of the Nyangire Rebellion presented here.

Instead of examining anti-colonial resistance, protest and liberation movements through the distorting lens of nationalist mythology, we must create a better "myth," one better suited to interpreting the reality of African protest. The meaning of nationalism must be stretched too far to accommodate protests such as Nyangire (or Mau Mau).[2] By focusing on the leadership, the communicators, be they chiefs or political party leaders, we have accepted an interpretation of anti-colonialism as "African nationalism," a movement to expel the aliens and restore "national" independence. If instead we look within the protest movements, at leaders and followers alike, we are apt to discover that the impulses which the leaders organize and interpret are profoundly anti-authoritarian and revolutionary rather than anti-foreign and "nationalist." A "myth of popular insurrection" may

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[1] D. Barnett and K. Njama, Mau Mau from Within (London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1966).

[2] Even Thomas Hodgkin's flexible definition seems too broad to be of much use, as it covers too many non-national sources of anti-colonial sentiment. Cf. T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (New York, New York University Press, 1957), p. 23.

lead us further and deeper in our understanding of twentieth century movements of protest and liberation than the failing "myth of nationalism" has brought us.[1] Working out this interpretation in detail is the arduous task facing historians and students of Africa who have found nationalism a "false start."

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[1] For those offended by the advocacy of a substitute "myth" instead of a call for objectivity, let me first apologize by indicating that the concept of interpretation can be substituted for that of myth and second recommend the chapter on "Myth and Society" in F. Welbourn and B. Ogot, A Place to Feel at Home (London, Oxford University Press, 1966) for an illuminating discussion of the role of myth in African societies under western impact.

EARLY GUSII RESISTANCE TO BRITISH RULE, 1905-14

Robert M. Maxon

Three times between 1905 and 1914 the British administration of what is now Kenya was involved in armed conflict with various sections of the Gusii people. Early Gusii resistance to British rule was first of all the result of some of the Gusii's attempting to stop British penetration of their homeland and the seizure of their herds in 1905. Some of these Gusii continued to resist British rule even after the establishment of an administrative post in Gusiiland. Their refusal to reconcile themselves to the new order led to the spearing of a British official and a second sharp encounter with European military might in 1908. Although they had suffered two defeats at the hands of the British, many of the Gusii still were not resigned to European rule. This was demonstrated by the fact that when a convenient circumstance presented itself in 1914, they launched an attack on the British administrative center in Gusiiland.

The military and punitive action which took place in response to Gusii resistance has been described in a variety of works, scholarly and non-scholarly.[1] These works have tended to view the resistance as having religious and/or emotional causes and therefore not being completely capable of rational explanation. Nevertheless, an analysis of the factors motivating opposition indicates that in each instance Gusii resistance was motivated by real grievances and was marked by a general desire to escape the imposition of British rule and its new system of authority.

The Gusii, who inhabit the highlands of southwestern Kenya just adjacent to Lake Victoria, were little affected by the advent of British

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[1] G.H. Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya, 1895-1912 (Oxford 1966); W. Robert Foran, A Cuckoo in Kenya (London, 1936); H. Moyse-Bartlett, The Kings African Rifles (Aldershot, 1956); Audrey Wipper, "The Gusii Rebels," in Robert I. Rotberg and Ali Mazrui, eds., Protest and Power in Black Africa (New York, 1970).

influence and colonial rule in East Africa down to the first decade of the twentieth century. Because the area in which they lived lay relatively far away from the caravan route to Uganda and later railway to Lake Victoria, neither the officials of the Imperial British East Africa Company nor of the Uganda Protectorate paid much attention to the Gusii.[1] The closest administrative post to the Gusii was located at Kisumu. However, no attempts were made to contact the Gusii or to bring them under British administration. That the British knew anything at all about them was due to Gusii rather than British initiative.

According to at least one anthropologist, the Gusii were divided among seven tribes. Used in this sense, the term refers to the largest sub-division recognized within Gusii society. In LeVine's words:

> Each tribe . . . far from being a unified political group was an alliance of the patrilineal clans in a defined area which recognized a common ancestor and totem animal distinct from other tribes and which acknowledged the possibility of compensation for homocide within the alliance.[2]

In each unit, a common tradition was also a determinant of tribal identity.

Prominent elders of the Mogusero, one of the Gusii "tribes," were the initiators of contact with the British. These elders sent appeals to the British for aid. Several factors seem to have been involved in stimulating the Mogusero elders to seek out the British. The Mogusero were the smallest of all the Gusii "tribes." Secondly, they occupied a tenuous position between the Nilotic-speaking Luo, who inhabited the lowlands closer to the

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[1]Gusiiland is the term used in this paper to describe the area inhabited by the Gusii who were usually referred to as the Kisii by Europeans during the colonial period.

[2]Robert A. LeVine and Barbara B. LeVine, Nyansongo: A Gusii Community in Kenya (New York, 1966), pp. 3-4.

lake and the Getutu, the largest and most powerful Gusii tribe. Around the turn of the century, Getutu attacks on the Mogusero became increasingly severe. Their numbers reduced and scattered for protection among the Luo and in other parts of Gusiiland, the Mogusero became quite desperate. Because of their plight, they decided to send envoys to Kisumu. Under the leadership of a prominent elder named Ombati, the mission sought British assistance against the enemies of Mogusero.[1]

Although no help of the kind desired by the Mogusero was offered by the British, both sides made valuable alliances for the future. Ombati proved most useful when the British later decided to establish themselves in Gusiiland, serving as guide and interpreter to the 1905 military expedition and keeping his people friendly toward the British until after colonial rule had been established. Alliance with the British, obviously the most powerful ingredient in the affairs of western Kenya at the turn of the century, seemed to offer the only chance of survival for the Mogusero. British military strength thus attracted the Mogusero, and as a result of British aid and favor, the small tribe was able to maintain an independent existence.

Although Gusiiland officially became part of the East African protectorate in 1902, its transfer from Uganda's Eastern province did not result in the beginning of British rule over the Gusii. No immediate steps were taken to bring the Gusii under European control, but their neighbors to the east, the Kipsigis, and to the west, the Luo, were brought under British rule with the establishment of administrative stations in 1902

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[1]C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: An Ethnological Survey (London, 1902), p. 51.

and 1903 respectively.[1] From both of these areas, the British were able to make contact with the Gusii and actually to visit Gusiiland.

The first officials to attempt to enter Gusiiland and make contact with the Gusii met with varying responses. H. B. Partington, the officer in charge of Kericho, visited the North Mogirango in late 1904. He was received in friendly fashion by the people of the area as one of the most wealthy and influential men of North Mogirango, Ndubi, had visited Kericho on more than one occasion.[2] In contrast to this amicable reception, the attempt of another official, F. W. Isaac, to enter Getutu in early 1905 was rendered "impossible by the defiant attitude of the Getutu."[3]

These differing responses to British penetration were to be typical of the Gusii response to the establishment of colonial rule. The people as a whole never put up a united front. This was reflective of the fact that the Gusii had no centralized relations between various tribes and clans. Even within the individual tribes, there were normally no permanent political institutions where decisions affecting the entire unit were made. In the course of the nineteenth century, moreover, the Gusii undertook united military action on only one occasion -- a great battle with the Kipsigis in the 1890's. Hostility and open fighting involving the various Gusii tribes and clans were not uncommon in precolonial times.[4]

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[1]Mungeam, p. 95 and G. A.S. Northcote, History of the District, Kenya National Archives (hereafter KNA): DC/KSI/3/4.

[2]G.A.S. Northcote, The Kisii, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2 and H.B. Partington, "Some Notes on the Kisii People," East African Quarterly, II, No. 4 (1905), 275.

[3]Northcote, The Kisii.

[4]Interview, P. Omwenga, 25 May 1969 and M. Oongo, 2 July 1969. According to Middleton and Tait, fighting among lineage groups is quite typical of peoples with no centralized political institutions. John Middleton and David Tait, eds., Tribes Without Rulers (New York, 1970), pp. 19-22.

A realization that the response of the Gusii to British rule was not completely friendly or completely hostile is essential in understanding the nature of early Gusii resistance to British rule.

Although the years 1902-1905 brought about closer contact between the Gusii and the British, it was Gusii relations with the Luo which were the most important cause of the hostilities which were to erupt in 1905. The Luo had previously been brought under British protection. By early 1905 Gusii attacks and cattle raids, especially by the Getutu and Nchari, on the Luo-inhabited areas to the west of Gusiiland had become a problem that the administration could not ignore. According to G.A.S. Northcote,[1] Assistant Collector in charge of Karungu from October 1904 to September 1906, the Gusii were "daily raiding the Kavirondo [Luo] along their borders and had terrorized their western neighbors."[2] The British could not ignore attacks on people who were, however tenuously, under their administration and protection. It was obvious that the raids could not be stopped nor compensation gained for the Luo without the use of armed forces. Thus Gusii relations with their Luo neighbors were the crucial factor in influencing the government of the East African Protectorate to dispatch a punitive force against Gusiiland which produced the first instance of armed conflict between the Gusii and the British.

A punitive expedition, besides serving its essential prupose, was deemed useful in British eyes as a springboard for the fulfillment of a long standing official ambition to establish administration over the Gusii.

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[1] An Oxford graduate, Northcote joined the Colonial Service in 1904. He served in Kenya until after World War I and eventually rose in the Colonial Service to become Governor of Hong Kong.

[2] Northcote, The Kisii.

Both Sir Charles Eliot[1] and his successor, Sir Donald Stewart, wished to see the Gusii brought under British rule. The latter also saw the area inhabited by the Gusii as a potential area for European settlement. Following the dispatch of a punitive expedition against the Sotik living to the east of Gusiiland in June 1905, Stewart wrote to the Colonial Office of his intentions:

> After the Sotik have been brought to reason, I hope the Kisii will give no trouble. It is most important to open this part of the Protectorate which is well adapted for European settlement . . . some of the Kisii are friendly and want us to establish a Government post in their country, but a large portion of this tribe is inimical and will be likely to give trouble. I have however great hopes that the punishment of the Sotik will bring them to reason.[2]

It was thus with more than one motive in mind that a military patrol was dispatched against the Gusii in September 1905. The officially stated objects of the patrol were "to obtain compensation for the murdered Kavirondo, if possible fine the culprits and select a suitable site for a new station in Kisii country."[3] The patrol consisted of one hundred men of V Company of the 3rd King's African Rifles (KAR) stationed at Kericho. Captain E. V. Jenkins was selected to command the force and Northcote was named to accompany the patrol as Chief Political Officer.[4] Fifty police from Kisumu were also assigned to the patrol.

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[1]Sir Charles Eliot, East Africa Protectorate (New York, 1966), p. 194.

[2]Stewart to Lyttleton, 8 June 1905, C.A. 533/2.

[3]J.D. Mackay, Intelligence Report of 3rd Battalion KAR for September 1905, enclosure in Jackson to Lyttleton, 19 September 1905, C.O. 534/1.

[4]Ibid.

The forces of the South Mogirango, Nchari, and Getutu "tribes" were involved in resisting the encroachment of the British. Since these groups as yet had not submitted to alien authority, this movement cannot be seen as a revolt against British rule. Rather, the opposition that the patrol encountered was self defense in response to the aggression of the invading force.[1]

Throughout the first two weeks it spent in Gusiiland, the patrol sought principally to collect cattle as fines for transgressions of the Gusii into Luo territory. When the cattle were not given over, as was almost always the case, forcible means of collection were resorted to. Individuals and groups of Gusii defended their homes and flocks against British attack, but the superior weapons of the patrol overcame this resistance and large numbers of cattle were captured in South Mogirango, Nchari and in western Getutu.

An alliance between Ombati of Mogusero and the British was a crucial factor in determining the nature of the conflict. Ombati had accompanied the British patrol as an interpreter. He used this position to pay off old scores with the Mariba clan of Nchari for the refusal of one of them to pay dowry for his sister. He also took revenge on the western Getutu,

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[1] Most notable T. O. Ranger, "Connexions Between 'Primary Resistance' Movements and Modern Mass Nationalism in East and Central Africa: II." Journal of African History, IX, No. 4 (1968), 632 and Wipper, p. 380. The latter source adopts this terminology from W. Robert Foran. Writing in 1935, Foran's account of the 1905 fighting, which Dr. Wipper accepts as completely factual and quotes from at length, contains a large amount of inaccuracy. The best example of this is her assertion that he took part as the leader of a detachment of 100 police. Foran, p. 177. The official report filed by the commanding officer just after the completion of the patrol indicates that the police contingent accompanying it only numbered 50 and that Foran was definitely not in command. E. V. Jenkins , General Report on the Kisii Patrol, enclosure in Jackson to Elgin, 9 December 1905, C. O. 534/1.

who were the worst enemies of the Mogusero.[1] Consequently, due to Ombati's influence, the most severe fighting took place with the western Getutu and the Nchari. In Nchari sixty-seven people were killed, while the hostilities in Getutu resulted in another sixty deaths.[2] The fact that there were no casualties on the British side attested to the one-sided nature of the battles.

The patrol left behind a legacy of ill feeling which continued to be remembered long after its departure from Gusiiland. The casualties, the loss of cattle, and the burning of homes were especially remembered by the Getutu of the areas affected by the fighting. These grievances, as well as the association of the British with Ombati, were sources of bitterness and antagonism against the British and the Mogusero even after the establishment of administration in other parts of Gusiiland. Although the patrol had inflicted relatively severe punishment, it had not broken the spirit of most men in western Getutu, nor made them anxious to accept British rule.[3]

Because of the absence of available British personnel, it was not until 1907 that a site for the construction of a government station was selected.[4] The station, to be known as Kisii, was located in Getembe, which bordered on the territories of Getutu, Nyaribari, and Nchari.[5]

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[1]Interview: Andrew Mokaya, 4 July 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969.

[2]Jenkins, General Report on the Kisii Patrol.

[3]Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969; Petro Omwenga, 25 May 1969.

[4]Report of the Province of Kisumu for Year 1905-06, KNA PC/NZA/1/1.

[5]It is perhaps worth noting at this point that Kisii was not, as Dr. Wipper claims, situated in the middle of Getutu location. Nor was the site of Kisii near the homeland of the Bogonko "clan" to whom she gives exaggerated importance in future resistance to British rule. The Bogonko lived on the Manga escarpment rising to the east of Kisii. Travel between this area was not easy, and for this reason British contact with the Bogonko was not great. Wipper, p. 385

Northcote was put in charge of the Kisii station. In May 1907 he began to construct permanent buildings, thus signaling the establishment of British rule in Gusiiland.[1]

Northcote was moderately successful in making his influence felt among many of the Gusii tribes. He succeeded in selecting and appointing chiefs and headmen, and in encouraging men to bring disputes before the administration for settlement to him. Both the hostility of the people and the large population of Getutu made it a difficult area to administer. Although Northcote had succeeded in appointing chiefs for all other tribes by the end of 1907, he had only been able to install a few headmen among the Getutu.[2] Thus, the Getutu were the only "tribe" over which a British appointed chief had not been placed. Moreover, almost no one from western Getutu brought their disputes to Northcote for settlement.

Northcote's arbitrary rule did nothing to convince the Getutu that there were advantages in submitting to the British. In gathering building materials and supplies for the men at work in constructing the station, Northcote often resorted to force when sufficient supplies were not immediately available through sale or barter.[3] Despite the fact that the grain and animals were later paid for, the effect of the use of such force served only to further alienate and estrange large sections of the Getutu.

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[1] Diary of G.A.S. Northcote (hereafter referred to as Northcote's Diary) 24 May 1907, KNA: DC/KSI/4/1.

[2] Ibid., 11 and 12 June 1907.

[3] In June 1907, for example, Northcote went into Getutu and took grain, goats, and sheep by force after his orders for meat and grain to be brought into the station had produced no results. Ibid., 6 and 8 June 1907.

Thus, unlike the other Gusii "tribes" some sections of the Getutu never accepted British rule. This was especially true of the Bogeka section which refused to co-operate with the European intruder. The inhabitants of Bogeka had been relatively hard hit by the patrol of 1905. It also bordered on Mogusero, and the people of Bogeka disliked British connections with Ombati. On hearing complaints in June 1907 from Luo living adjacent to Bogeka, Northcote went to the area, but he found the local elders were unwilling to meet him. Though he threatened them with reprisals, the inhabitants of the region did not bring in the cattle they were alleged to have stolen from the Luo or the fine levied by Northcote for the killing of two Luo men.[1]

Since the Bogeka were unwilling to concede that the British administrator had the right to command, Northcote decided to rely on more forceful measures. Faced with the problem of further cattle thefts in this area, he sent out thirty-five policemen to recover the stolen cattle. The police were attacked and they killed at least four of the attackers before returning to Kisii.[2] Although Northcote kept only sixty-five head of cattle and returned the rest, this incident did not do much to endear the British presence in Gusiiland to these Getutu.

At this juncture, many of the Bogeka began to look to religious forces, and more specifically, to the teaching of a prophetess for inspiration. The prophet tradition among the Getutu was not a new phenomenon created by the arrival of the foreigners. In the years immediately preceding the coming of the British, for example, the great prophet Zakaw had wielded

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[1] Ibid., 8 June 1907.

[2] Ibid., 26 July 19071

important influence and authority in the area. Generally conceded to have supernatural powers, he had been the main instigator of Getutu campaigns against the Mogusero. Thus, Gusii social structure already possessed an institution which could be called upon to lead resistance against the British.[1]

Bogeka grievances against the British, therefore, found articulation in the person of the influential prophetess, Muraa. She had spoken out against the intrusion of the British from the moment that they had first set foot in Gusiiland. According to elderly Getutu who remember her, she continuously agitated against British presence in Kisii. A constant theme was to denigrate the valor of young men who seemed to be afraid of a single white man. For Muraa amd many other Getutu, Northcote was the administration. His elimination would thus have seemed to them to have meant an end to the alien occupation of Gusiiland.

Northcote was not unaware of the ability of Muraa to strengthen and influence resistance in Bogeka and vicinity. In November 1907 he arrested her following a struggle in which one man was wounded. After holding a large baraza (public discussion) with prominent elders in the area, the Assistant District Commissioner felt that the people of the region had seen reason and would be more friendly to the administration.[2]

This, however, was not to be the case. By January of the following year, further trouble had developed in the area. In December of 1907 the Assistant District Commissioner had begun tax collection in Gusiiland. Since the administration insisted that the tax be paid in money, Gusii

[1]Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1968; Morris Oongo, 25 May 1969.

[2]Northcote's diary, 24 November 1907.

men were forced to sell cattle, goats and sheep in order to obtain rupees with which to pay the tax. As a result, many Swahili and Somali cattle traders were drawn to the district. In early January when Swahili traders were in Bogeka, they had some money stolen from them by a man named Otenyo. The traders reported the matter to Northcote who decided to investigate the charge. Northcote was taken by some elders to Otenyo's home. The inhabitants of the adjacent village ran away, and although Northcote called on them to return, they refused. After waiting for approximately an hour for the accused to send him a cow, Northcote took two cows and proceeded on his journey.

Northcote never completed his journey because he was attacked and speared. According to Getutu accounts, when Muraa, who had been released, saw the Assistant District Commissioner taking the cattle away, she became infuriated. No doubt remembering the events of November, she began to insult the young men nearby in very abusive terms. She told them that they were just like women -- did not they care that their cattle were being taken? On hearing this abuse, Otenyo picked up his spear and went off along the route Northcote was following. He got ahead of the British official and lay waiting for him in the tall grass beside the path along which Northcote was riding. As Northcote was passing on his horse, somewhat behing the police detail accompanying him, Otenyo threw his spear at the official and struck him in the back inflicting a painful but not fatal wound.[1]

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[1] Foran states that Northcote was riding out to investigate disturbances that the former had alerted the Assistant District Commissioner about just prior to the time of the spearing. Foran, p. 338. Northcote's Diary agrees conclusively with accounts of the event provided by old men in what is today Bogeka sub-location that the actual sequence of events was as set out above. Northcote's Diary, 11 January 1908. Interview: P. Omwenga, 25 May 1969; Mzee Ongaro, 26 May 1969. This is only one of the many instances in Foran's account of the 1908 fighting which gives exaggerated importance to his role in events.

This spearing of a British administrative officer was of considerable significance as it touched off open resistance on the part of the Gusii and led to harsh punitive measures from the British side. Several writers have regarded this incident as the sole manifestation and reason for Gusii hostility and have placed the blame on Muraa.[1] She is thus seen as having not only produced hostility to British rule but also to have caused the discontent that led to fighting between the Getutu and the British. Newspaper accounts of the time took this line as well, blaming the resistance on the "anti-European crusade being persistently preached by tribal witchdoctors."[2]

Though perhaps soothing to the imperialist mind, the idea that this resistance resulted entirely from the evil machinations of a female "witchdoctor," and that because her influence was based on magico-religious sanctions it was irrational, hardly represents the true picture. There is no doubt that Muraa played a considerable part in the spearing of Northcote, believing perhaps that with his death the British presence would vanish. Nor can it be doubted that the fact that Muraa was regarded as having magical powers gave her considerable influence in western Getutu. Yet, those interpretations which focus on Muraa, the nature of her influence and the emotional character of her appeal, nevertheless greatly oversimplify the issue, for it is possible to suggest rational and understandable reasons for her opposition to the British. According to some present day elders, she was motivated by the fear, based on the initial contacts of other Gusii groups with the British, that the coming of colonial rule would mean an

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[1] For example: Foran, p. 342; Wipper, p. 411; J.A. Hunter and Dan Mannix, African Bush Adventures (London, 1954), pp. 202-03.

[2] East African Standard (25 January 1908), p. 11.

end to her own influence.[1] No matter what her own motivations, moreover, Muraa did not have to invent hostility to the British among the people of Bogeka. Antagonism to the British was great as a result of the events of 1905 and what most people considered the arbitrary seizure of cattle on more than one occasion. Muraa's incitement of the spearing served to touch off armed resistance to British rule, but she did not create the grievances that caused it.

After the spearing, Northcote was carried back to Kissi by the police accompanying him, but he was still in great danger. He took immediate steps to protect the station and to get word to his superiors. He sent two policemen with news of the attack to provincial headquarters at Karungu. Although confined to his bed, Northcote arranged his meagre forces for the defense of the station.[2]

With the spearing of Northcote, there was general rejoicing in Bogeka at the removal of European rule. British authority would not now be effectively extended to them. The young men in Bogeka and the surrounding areas of western Getutu took up arms to attack and destroy the most obvious manifestations of alien domination: Kisii town and its alien inhabitants. When it was learned on the day after the spearing that Northcote was not dead, large numbers took up arms and set off for Kisii to attack the town.

This was thus a crucial day for the safety of the station. Around noon on January 12th, the Getutu began to mass on the hills surrounding Kisii. The bedridden Assistant District Commissioner had already concentrated

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[1]Interview: Paul Nyamweya, 28 May 1969; Erasto Abuga, 8 July 1969.

[2]Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908.

the forces at his disposal around his house. Barbed wire was laid down, and all who knew how to use a rifle were armed. Northcote also collected all the women, traders, and servants in Kisii outside his house. This made an imposing looking force, but most were unarmed.[1] The sight of all these people, however, was enough to dissuade the forces on the hillside from attacking. In 1905 many of them had learned the folly of attacking a force armed with rifles. They withdrew from the vicinity of Kisii and never really threatened it again.

Although an assault was not launched on Kisii, many Getutu found other targets for their revenge. The two most important categories of people selected for Getutu revenge were those whom the colonial system had introduced into Gusiiland, and secondly, the groups which the British had protected. Raids were made on the Luo living in the neighboring location of Membo. Cattle were stolen, huts burned, and at least two Luo men killed.[2] This was the kind of activity that Northcote had previously used force to try to stop. It is significant also that the others who died as a result of western Getutu taking up arms -- two policemen and an Indian trader -- were brought to Gusiiland by British rule. These acts and the spearing itself clearly represented the desire of the people of western Getutu to resist the inauguration of British rule among them and to see the alien presence removed from Gusiiland altogether.

Throughout the disputes between the British and the western Getutu, the other sections of the Gusii remained outside of the fray. On the

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[1] Northcote to his father, 12 February 1908, KNA: DC/KSI/4/1.

[2] J.D. Mackay, Report on Operations Against the Rebellious Sections of the Kisii Tribe (hereafter Mackay's Report), enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 3 March 1908, C.O. 533/42.

same day as the threatened attack on Kisii, most of the government appointed chiefs went to the station to pledge their loyalty to the administration.[1] Those members of the western Getutu who were in revolt against the British seem to have made no attempts to win the allegiance and support of the other Gusii "tribes." The attack on Northcote had not been planned well in advance. More than likely, those who had taken up arms never considered joining in a common cause with the other "tribes" against the British. In this way both those who joined and those who abstained from the revolt were obeying the principles of Gusii tradition: namely that joint action and a united front against a common enemy were not part of the Gusii political heritage.

Gusii attacks on the Luo and the killing of the policemen and trader convinced the British that strong punitive action was necessary. John Ainsworth, Provincial Commissioner of Kisumu Province and a veteran administrator in the East African Protectorate, received a letter on January 12 from Northcote detailing the spearing. Because Ainsworth decided that the problem was limited to a small group, he proceeded to Gusiiland to investigate the incident with only a small patrol of KAR.[2] On the 14th he received word of the further raids which he termed "a general rising of the Kitutu clan against the government."[3] He therefore initiated sterner measures; the Assistant District Superintendent of Police at Kisumu,

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[1]Northcote's Diary, 12 January 1908.

[2]John Ainsworth, Report to the P.C. Kisumu to H.E. the Governor on the Recent Kisii Revolt and its Suppression (hereafter Ainsworth's Report), enclosure in Sadler to Elgin, 3 March 1908, C. O. 533/42.

[3]Ibid.

Robert Foran, was sent to Kisii with all available police. Though he had only recently returned from Gusiiland, Foran set off the same day with a force of fifty-two men.[1] Ainsworth also ordered the 5th KAR stationed at Lumbwa to send fifty men to Kisii. At the same time, the Provincial Commissioner wired the Governor telling of the further hostilities. It was this telegram which led to the dispatch of a full scale punitive expedition against the Gusii.[2]

The government quickly set in motion the steps necessary for the dispatch of an armed force to defeat the Gusii. A contingent of 327 KAR with fourteen British officers was sent to Kisumu by train. On January 22, the force, which had been augmented by fifty Nandi levies and John Ainsworth as Chief Political Officer, entered Gusiiland. The expedition succeeded in capturing cattle, burning huts and killing anyone who tried to stand in its way.[3] Even though the Getutu avoided pitched battles, their spears proved no match for the rifles and machine-guns of their adversary. By February 5, when the operation came to a close, the Gusii had suffered considerable losses. Two hundred and forty men had been killed, over seven thousand head of cattle were in the hands of the invading force, and another five thousand sheep and goats had been seized. During the entire engagement

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[1]Foran, p. 338. This account also contains some exaggeration in the time it took Foran to make the trip.

[2]Ainsworth's Report.

[3]Northcote thought the whole operation too severe and poorly carried out. "It would take too long," he later wrote his father, "to describe the absolute idoicy, obstinacy and want of knowledge of military operations in this country that they shewed." Northcote to his father, 12 Feb. 1908.

the British forces suffered no loss of life.[1]

The severity of the suppression of the Getutu was justified in British eyes as necessary to teach the Getutu and in effect the entire Gusii people a lesson and ensure acceptance of British rule. After the end of military activity, Angwenyi, who had not taken up arms against the colonial government, was made chief of Getutu. With the appointment of a single chief for every Gusii tribe, the British settled down to begin a systematic form of administration in all parts of Gusiiland. With the punitive expedition clear in the memory of both Getutu and non-Getutu, there was no open challenge to the colonial authorities.[2]

Yet the very harshness and brutality of the KAR left a legacy of hostility and bitterness among many Gusii. While armed defiance to alien rule was obviously out of the question, this did not mean acceptance of it or acquiescence to the changes it brought. Given the proper circumstances, many Gusii would demonstrate their opposition in other ways.

In many ways the political, economic and social changes introduced and brought about by the British in the years before the First World War tended to keep alive and reinforce feelings of antagonism for British rule among the Gusii. Very significant and, in some instances, quite far reaching alterations were brought about in the lives of the Gusii. Changes in Gusii institutions were initiated and new patterns of behavior were expected. While the Gusii did not openly oppose these innovations, many disliked the adjustments required of them. In this way discontent, and no doubt a longing for a return to the past, continued to be felt by most of the people.

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[1] Ainsworth's Report.

[2] In looking at the causes and courses of the hostilities in both 1905 and 1908, it is impossible to sustain Dr. Wipper's conclusion that "both were premeditated and planned, determined and persistent on the part of the Gusii." Wipper, p. 384.

The political and judicial systems that began to function all over Gusiiland after the suppression of the 1908 resistance were quite different from those existing in colonial times. The Gusii tribes, with the exception of the North and South Moriango, each came to form the basis of a new administrative unit. The chiefs of each of these divisions were granted more powers and responsibilities than any individual had ever possessed in pre-colonial times. The same could be said for the judicial system that was imposed on the Gusii. This was especially true in criminal cases, where the novel concepts introduced by the British represented a radical departure from the pre-colonial pattern. Consequently, criminal procedure did not gain wide acceptance among the people.

Some of the social and economic innovations which marked the first years of colonial rule necessitated new forms of behavior and activity that were not easily accepted. Egeserate or cattle villages were abolished by administrative order in 1912, and Gusii young men, who had traditionally lived there and guarded their families' cattle, were brought more under control of the elders.[1] Economic changes also caused much dislocation and difficulty. The capture of large numbers of cattle by the 1908 expedition deprived many Getutu of their most important source of wealth. Despite the fact that some were returned as payment for road building, most Getutu continued to resent the appropriation of their cattle. The most distasteful aspect of the new economic system was the British insistence that able bodied men should leave home and seek wage paying employment. However,

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[1] See LeVine and LeVine, p. 29.

because of Gusii opposition to these demands very few men could be obliged to obey the new strictures. It was not until 1913, when the British began to force men to work away from home, that any substantial numbers began to leave the village.[1,2]

That the Gusii did not accept European rule wholeheartedly is illustrated further by the Gusii reaction to the coming of Christian missions. The Roman Catholic Mill Hill Fathers opened a mission station at Nyabururu outside Kisii in December 1911.[3] Little interest was shown in what they had to offer. In his history of the Mill Hill Fathers, Gale has put the case most graphically: "The Bakisi themselves were unfriendly to the mission because they associated all white men with those who had led the punitive expedition against them."[4] The Seventh Day Adventists, who began mission work in 1913, were even less successful. By the beginning of World War I, they had not succeeded in making a single convert.[5]

Most Gusii had not completely reconciled themselves to British rule and the resulting innovations by the beginning of World War I. Many still remembered with bitterness the fighting of 1905 and 1908 and the memory acted as a deterrent against any direct challenge to the colonial administration. Yet when the opportunity presented itself, Gusii hostility to British rule would come violently to the surface.

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[1]South Kavirondo 1st Quarterly Report for 1911-12, KNA: DC/KSI/1/1.

[2]SKDAR 1913-14, KNA: DC/KSI/1/a.

[3]Dr. Wipper is wrong in saying Nyaribari. Wipper, p. 388.

[4]H. P. Gale, Uganda and the Mill Hill Fathers (London, 1959) p. 299.

[5]SKDAR 1913-14.

The German invasion of September 1914 presented the Gusii with just such an opportunity. On hearing that the Germans were approaching Kisii, the District Commissioner and his staff evacuated the station.[1] In the course of their withdrawal to the lake port of Kendu, they met three companies of KAR on their way to do battle with the Germans, Early on the 12th, the District Commissioner, C. E. Spencer, accompanied the KAR force back to Kisii which they found occupied by the Germans. After a battle which lasted until the early afternoon, both European forces withdrew from the town. Except for a few Indian traders and wounded German soldiers, Kisii was left unoccupied.[2]

The Gusii now took their opportunity to vent their spleen against the British. Large numbers of Gusii from Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari entered the town. They sacked and looted most of the buildings. The damage done to the commercial and government buildings, especially the District Commissioner's house, was quite extensive.[3] The Roman Catholic and Seventh Day Adventist mission stations, previously evacuated, were looted as well.[4]

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[1]Wipper places the date, wrongly, on September 19. Wipper, p. 391.

[2]East African Standard (19 September 1914), p. 17; W. T. Shorthouse, "The Battle of Kisii," extract from Sport and Adventure in Africa, KNA: DC/KSI/3/6.

[3]The hospital was so severely damaged that the Medical Officer from Kisumu stated after a visit to Kisii that "the Kisii Dispensary no longer exists." J. Hannigan to Principal Medical Officer, 15 October 1914, KNA: Ministry of Health, Medical 43/235.

[4]SKDAR 1914-15, KNA: DC/KSI/1/2.

When the British returned on the afternoon of the 13th, they decided to employ stern punitive measures. The District Commissioner ordered all things taken from Kisii to be returned. The KAR undertook operations against the parts of Getutu, Nyaribari and Nchari deemed most responsible. A fine of 10,000 cattle was levied and collected by force.[1] In addition, more than sixteen hundred men were sent out to work, after being called into Kisii for a baraza.[2]

Although this brief uprising clearly indicated Gusii dislike for British rule, later colonial officials[3] and some scholars[4] have not properly assessed the role played by the concrete grievances of the Gusii as a motive for the sacking of the town. Rather, they stress the role of the cult of Mumbo (known as Nyamumbo to the Gusii) as motivating Gusii resistance in 1914. In Dr. Wipper's words.

> The sect's existence became patently evident on September 19, 1914, when the Germans invaded Kisii from what was then German East Africa and the British vacated the town in order to mobilize resistance and return. Believing Mumbo's prophecy that the British would soon depart, the local inhabitants mistook their temporary exodus for the millenium and looted the town and the neighboring missions.[5]

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[1] W. M. Logan, History of the Wakisii or Abagusti, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2.

[2] C. E. Spencer to J. Ainsworth, 30 September 1914, KNA: PC/NZA. 3/65/47. Interview: Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969.

[3] See for example: District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 August 1928, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2.

[4] Wipper, p. 391.

[5] Ibid.

Mumboism seems to have first developed among the Luo of Central Kavirondo (later Central Nyanza) in 1913. From there it spread to South Kavirondo, carried, according to Dr. Wipper, by Seventh Day Adventist mission adherents. It rejected European customs, emphasized traditional mores, and advocated a return to the way of life existing before the coming of European rule. It promised the destruction of the colonial order. The world was to undergo a great cataclysm at which time a terrible vengeance would befall the enemies of the Mumboites.[1] It also promised the coming of a millenium in which the believers in Mumbo would be blessed with utopian wealth in abundance.[2] The implication of all this was that the early departure of the British was expected by believers.

Merely because the withdrawal of the British from Kisii seems to fit in with Mumbo teaching about the departure of the Europeans and the impending millenium does not provide proof that Mumbo teachings were influential enough in 1914 to cause the looting of the station. Neither is the fact that Mumboism won a following in Gusiiland in later years a sufficient reason. It must be fairly conclusively shown that Mumboism did exist among the Gusii before September 1914.

There is really no evidence of the existence of Mumboism as a strong force among the Gusii in September 1914. There is no contemporary documentary evidence which would suggest that Mumboism was the cause of this incident. It is mentioned nowhere in the correspondence regarding the up-

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[1] Ibid., p. 397.

[2] Ibid., p. 398.

rising in 1914 and 1915.[1] The only piece of evidence that gives the impression of Mumbo responsibility for the sacking of Kisii is a letter written by Father Sheffer of the Roman Catholic mission at Asumbi to the District Commissioner in 1918. In general very hostile to the cult of Mumbo, Father Sheffer stated that "Mumbo people were responsible for the looting of September 1914."[2] Yet Asumbi lay in Luo country, and the looting described no doubt refers to the looting of the mission station by Luo that took place in that month. In 1914 Father Sheffer had been in the area for little more than a year, and his contact with Gusii must have been minimal. This letter is, in short, extremely inconclusive proof that Mumboism was responsible for the attack on Kisii in 1914.

In fact, a fairly large amount of evidence indicates that Mumboism and Mumbo teachings were not involved in the looting at all. Gusii elders who remember the sacking of the station unanimously deny that Mumboism had any part in the events of September 11 and 12.[3] Administration records dating from 1914 and 1915 verify this fact. In 1915 a fairly thorough investigation was undertaken of Mumboism in the district.

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[1] For example, see: SKDAR 1914-15; Spencer to Ainsworth, 30 September 1914. Even in 1918, Ainsworth did not regard Mumboism as threat to peace and order. In describing his experience with the movement he wrote: "I failed to detect in it any disloyal or harmful tendency and formed the opinion that to take official notice of the matter was to do more harm than good." It seems certain that he could not have written these words if he had thought that Mumboism had been responsible for the sack of Kisii.

[2] P. Sheffer to District Commissioner, 1 December 1918, KNA: DC/KSI/3/1.

[3] Interview: Paul Nyamwega, 28 May 1969; Erasto Abuga, 27 May 1969.

The complete reports of this investigation show that it was carried out only in Luo areas.[1] It seems most unlikely that if the cult were strong enough in Gusiiland to result in the looting of Kisii, the administration would not have investigated it there as well.

It is most doubtful that the teachings of Mumbo would have won such wide acceptance as to promote open hostility by September 1914. Mumboism had developed considerable appeal among the Gusii by the end of the war years as a result of bad economic conditions, forced labor, and epidemic disease. What drew those who became involved in the sect to Mumboism were these considerations of the real world and not, in most cases, the religious appeal. Mumboism had not attracted many devoted adherents in Gusiiland by the time World War I began. This is clearly indicated by a letter of the District Commissioner in 1918.

> During the year 1914-15, a new religion 'Mumbo' made its appearance in this district, having its chief attraction the doctrine that all white men would leave the protectorate. . . Recently the religion made its appearance among the Kisii and a number of teachers began instructing the people.[2]

The fact that Mumboism was not involved in the attack on Kisii in 1914 may also be inferred from an examination of who took part and, more importantly, who did not take part. If Mumboism were influential enough to cause this attack and looting, then it is hard to explain why only those Gusii living in the vicinity of the town were involved. It

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[1] S. H. Fazan, Report on Investigation Made Concerning the Worship of Mumbo, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2.

[2] District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 28 November 1918, KNA: DC/KSI/3/2. Wipper quotes only the first part of the letter but not the second sentence. Wipper, p. 391.

is also difficult to reconcile the fact that the Bogonko "clan" took little or no part if, as Dr. Wipper maintains, they provided the "core of support for Mumboism" among the Gusii.[1] Many Bogonko were later active in what was regarded by the administration as Mumboism[2], but in 1914 they were certainly not in the forefront in the rising against the British.[3]

It is thus apparent that the sack of Kisii in September 1914 was not the result of Mumbo teachings or agitation -- it was the result of Gusii dissatisfaction with the new ways of colonial rule. Although British administration had been in effect for seven years, most Gusii had not completely reconciled themselves to the new forms of authority. They wished to return to the days before the many bothersome controls introduced by the British. When the administration withdrew from the station, those Gusii in the vicinity vented their hostility by damaging many of the buildings and carrying off the contents. This was a short and relatively uncoordinated attack; it did not involve all Gusii by any means, but it did symbolize Gusii hatred of the alien presence and all it implied in Gusiiland.

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[1]Wipper, p. 410.

[2]District Commissioner to Provincial Commissioner, 1 August 1928.

[3]Interview: Mzee Ongaro, 2 July 1969.

After taking the form of self defense in 1905, early Gusii resistance to British rule involved attempts by some of the Getutu to stop the extension of colonial administration to themselves by removing it from Gusiiland in 1908. An attempt was made on the life of the sole British official responsible for administering Gusiiland; once the attack was made, further attacks were launched against individuals and rules which owed their presence in Gusiiland to British rule. A further attack was made on what seemed to be the most obvious remains of the colonial system following the British withdrawal from Kisii in 1914. These two latter instances of armed resistance were the result, for the most part, not of religious and emotional or irrational appeals and forces, but of understandable grievances. First Gusii contacts with the British and their early experiences of colonial rule produced antagonism among many of the Gusii, and some took up arms and engaged in hostile acts as a result.

Not all Gusii forcibly opposed the British in 1905, 1908 and 1914, but these instances of resistance to colonial rule, though they failed to end the alien presence in Gusiiland, have considerable significance. Much of the later Gusii response to British rule and its innovations can be more easily understood against the early background of hostility. So, too, can the forms which later resistance to European domination took.

The lesson had been clearly driven home that British rule could not be thrown off by armed force. Some therefore reconciled themselves to European authority. Nevertheless, for others the events of 1905, 1908 and 1914 were not forgotten, nor were the heroes. They were to serve as inspiration for the next generation of opponents to colonial rule.

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